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I. Introduction 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s death raised growing anxiety about 
ideological judging to a fever pitch. Congressional Republicans 
refused to schedule hearings for President Obama’s nominee to fill 
the vacated seat, Merrick Garland, lest a liberal judicial majority 
emerge.1 The Democrats retaliated with an attempted filibuster 
designed to stop the confirmation of President Trump’s nominee, 
Neil Gorsuch, which was thwarted by a change in Senate rules.2  
Public concern about Supreme Court nominees reflects a 
perception that a Justice’s political leaning affects constitutional 
rulings and usually focuses on the abortion rights issue. Most 
scholarship addressing the effect of Supreme Court Justices’ 
ideology on their decision-making likewise focuses on rulings 
interpreting the Constitution.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, 170-Plus Days and Counting: GOP Unlikely to 
End Supreme Court Blockade Soon, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016) 
https://www.npr.org/2016/09/06/492857860/173-days-and-counting-gop-unlikely-
to-end-blockade-on-garland-nomination-soon (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file 
with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See, e.g., Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear 
Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-
senate.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 3. See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN 
HISTORY (2004) (focusing on constitutional law cases); MARK J. RICHARDS, THE 
POLITICS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2013) (focusing on free speech cases); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, 
31618, 32425 (2002) (finding strong support for the attitudinal model of judging 
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Many opponents of Neil Gorsuch’s nomination, however, 
suggested that his political leanings influence his statutory 
interpretation and that interpretation of statutes can have a huge 
effect on the law.4 In particular, campaigners against the Gorsuch 
nomination focused on the so-called “freezing trucker” case, in 
which Judge Gorsuch dissented from a 10th Circuit ruling 
affirming an award of damages to a trucker who was fired for 
disobeying an order to drive his unsafe rig or remain in an 
unheated cab in subzero temperatures.5 His opponents argued, in 
effect, that Gorsuch’s conclusion that the whistleblower provision 
of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act did not forbid firing 
the trucker reflected a bias against workers.6 Senators at his 
                                                                                                     
in Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure cases); Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 
6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (outlining a theoretical and empirical argument based 
solely on cases where the Court considers the constitutionality of federal 
legislation for viewing the Court as a member of national partisan regimes that 
generally track the preferences of those regimes); cf. Mark Latham, The 
Rehnquist Court and the Pollution Control Cases: Anti-Environmental and 
Pro-Business?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 135 (2007) (concluding that the 
Rehnquist Court was not anti-environmental in pollution control cases); Richard 
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1717, 1718 (1997) (systematically studying the role of ideology in D.C. Circuit 
environmental law cases, rather than in Supreme Court cases). 
 4. See, e.g., Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 115th Cong. 12 (2017) 
[hereinafter Nomination] (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary) (citing numerous statutory cases in which the Supreme 
Court was divided 5–4, with a Republican majority favoring business interests 
over ordinary citizens’ interests). 
 5. See TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1207, 
121517 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting); Elie Mystal, The ‘Frozen Truck 
Driver’ Case Democratic Senators are Hanging on Neil Gorsuch, ABOVE THE LAW 
(Mar. 20, 2017, 4:04 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/the-frozen-truck-
driver-case-democratic-senators-are-hanging-on-neil-gorsuch/ (last updated Mar. 
21, 2017, 10:55 AM) (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (noting that several Democratic 
senators emphasized Gorsuch’s callous dissent in this “Frozen Trucker” case in 
the nomination hearing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See TransAm Trucking, Inc., 833 F.3d at 1208 (noting that this case arose 
under the whistleblower provision); cf. Camille E. Peeples, Essay: Rights, Facts, 
and Relevant Inquiries: Surveying Judge Neil M. Gorsuch’s Employment Law 
Jurisprudence, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 193, 197 n.16 (2017) (citing TransAm as 
showing that Gorsuch does not defer to agencies, especially when their actions 
contradict statutory language). 
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confirmation hearing also relied heavily on his statutory rulings in 
arguing that Judge Gorsuch favors corporations over workers 
across a broad range of cases.7  
The effect of judicial ideology on the Supreme Court’s 
statutory interpretation, however, has received less systematic 
study than questions about ideology’s role in constitutional law 
cases.8 When the Justices interpret statutes, do they simply enact 
their political views into law under the guise of a judicial opinion, 
so that party affiliation rather than legal considerations explain 
what the Court does?9 Or should we view the Supreme Court as 
                                                                                                     
 7. See, e.g., Nomination, supra note 4, at 1–4 (questions for the record of 
Sen. Al Franken, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (questioning Gorsuch about pro-big 
business holdings in an antitrust case); Nomination, supra note 4 (questions for 
the record of Sen. Patrick Leahy, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (questioning 
Gorsuch on a narrow interpretation of statutory protection against a hostile work 
environment). 
 8. Cf. Mario Bergara, Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling 
Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 262, 26768 (2003) (finding that from 19471992, as the 
liberalism of congressional “players” increased, so too did the percentage of liberal 
statutory decisions); but cf. Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the 
Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 4243 (1997) 
(finding that from 19471992, Supreme Court Justices did not generally temper 
sincere ideological preferences to rationally anticipate overrides by Congress). For 
a mixed assessment of whether credible threats from Congress affect votes of 
ideological “outlier” Justices in statutory cases, see Thomas G. Hansford & David 
F. Damore, Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of Threat, and Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 28 AM. POL. Q. 490, 50405 (2000). Earlier work also found 
variance in the relationship between judicial and congressional ideological 
composition. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 340, 34647, 34952 (1991) (finding 
from 19671990, Congress was more likely to override decisions featuring an 
ideologically divided Court, but from 19861990 Congress was more likely to 
override “identifiably conservative” decisions than liberal ones).  On the role of 
statutory decisions in assessing the Court’s influence on policymaking, see 
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 50, 5657 (1976) (arguing that accounts of the Court’s influence on 
national policymaking are incomplete without attention to the Court’s power of 
statutory interpretation); Dahl, supra note 3, at 29394 (finding a limited role for 
the Court as part of a “dominant alliance,” but focusing on constitutional 
decisions). 
 9. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993) (providing what is generally understood to be the 
canonical statement of the relationship between judicial ideological preferences 
and voting patterns); see also SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 3. Some political 
scientists have modeled empirical support for the influence of both legal and 
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obeying statutory language, which often proves more specific and 
more recent than constitutional language? And how does the 
Court’s approach square with democracy and the rule of law? Does 
the Court reflect the will of the Congress that enacted the statute? 
Or is the Court perhaps performing a different democratic function 
by updating the statute to reflect contemporary political 
preferences and/or address new problems?10 And, perhaps most 
importantly, should the Court be doing things differently? If so, 
how? These questions prove difficult to study, because they require 
a combination of political science, an understanding of the statutes 
being interpreted, and familiarity with approaches to statutory 
interpretation. 
This Article addresses these questions by studying the history 
of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA),11 
which now goes back almost half a century. Many scholars have 
argued that the Court has shifted from an approach to statutory 
interpretation that relied heavily on purposivism—the custom of 
giving statutory goals weight in interpreting statutes—toward one 
that relies more heavily on textualism during this period.12 At the 
same time, proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation have 
argued that courts, in many cases, do not so much excavate a 
statute’s meaning as adapt a statute to contemporary 
circumstances.13  
The CAA provides a useful prism for evaluating these accounts 
descriptively and normatively. The Court has taken a keen interest 
                                                                                                     
ideological factors in U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. See MICHAEL A. 
BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT 4763 (2011); LEE 
EPSTEIN, WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES 2564 (2013) (finding a substantial effect of ideological preferences on 
decision-makingparticularly at the U.S. Supreme Courtwhile also noting that 
a variety of legal and professional factors may also affect judicial behavior); Mark 
J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002). 
 10. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(1994). 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
 12. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 13. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 910 (arguing that as a statute ages the 
legislature’s original intent loses relevance and courts adapt the statute to 
changed circumstances). 
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in the CAA.14 Indeed, its interest in recent years has led it to review 
some cases that generated neither circuit splits nor, arguably, 
important national issues.15 Over the years, the Court has decided 
20 cases interpreting the CAA, a body of case law sufficiently large 
to ground a focused study of approaches to statutory 
interpretation, but not so huge that it defies coherent qualitative 
study. In recent years, the Court has issued a series of rulings 
addressing EPA’s attempt to grapple with climate disruption, the 
most important new environmental issue of the last fifteen years.16 
These recent decisions provide a case study in dynamic statutory 
interpretation, as the Court has struggled to adapt the CAA to an 
important problem not fully anticipated when Congress amended 
the CAA in 1990, let alone when Congress first enacted it in its 
modern form in 1970.17 At the same time, we have some older cases 
that establish a baseline which facilitates inquiry into whether the 
shifts that have occurred over time reflect new politics, new 
problems, or new judicial philosophies.18  
Focusing on the CAA provides an opportunity to discuss the 
role of political shifts in attitudes toward the statute itself in 
Supreme Court adjudication. Specifically, elite opinion and 
political opinion have shifted in ways that matter to CAA 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra notes 15, 16, 25, 26 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 270607 (2015) (reviewing a single 
ruling about whether EPA must consider cost in deciding whether regulation of 
an electric utility’s hazardous air pollution is appropriate and necessary, when it 
has already considered cost in crafting the regulation); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 308, 313 (2014) (reviewing a single ruling about reducing 
the applicability of general CAA program to greenhouse gases even when more 
specific standards will likely prove more important).  
 16. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 333–34 (reversing EPA rule 
tailoring source coverage of greenhouse gas emitters); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011) (holding that the CAA displaces a federal 
common law nuisance claims against carbon dioxide emitters); Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the CAA authorizes EPA regulation 
of greenhouse gases).  
 17. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, with Some Limits, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-limits-epas-ability-to-
regulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3-914c-
1fbd0614e2d4_story.html?utm_term=.ef8b3cb5c8fb (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 18. See KECK, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that ideas affect judicial behavior). 
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interpretation since Congress last amended the statute in 1990.19 
One can compare shifts of attitude in judicial opinions with 
changes in elite and political opinion to develop a specific account 
of dynamic statutory interpretation’s response to political 
developments.  
Part II provides a basic account of the CAA and its evolution 
to provide a grounding for understanding the particular cases to 
come. But the CAA is so vast and the problems that arise under it 
so varied that the presentation of many statutory details must wait 
until the cases implicating them become the focus of analysis. This 
section also discusses the evolution of political and elite attitudes 
toward the CAA in order to provide a basis for the evaluation of 
dynamic statutory interpretation to follow.  
Part III develops a baseline in the interpretation of the statute 
from 1970 to 2004. This Part develops the concepts of purposivism 
and textualism in this context and examines how they play out in 
the case law of this period. The standard accounts of statutory 
interpretation suggest that the Supreme Court’s approach shifted 
from a heavy reliance on purpose to a much heavier reliance on 
text.20 This section tests this account in the CAA context and 
uncovers a surprise—judicial pursuit of goals unmoored from text 
and purpose in the 1980s, which delayed the shift to textualism in 
the CAA context. 
Part IV argues that more recent Supreme Court CAA cases 
evince a shift to dynamic statutory interpretation, but in two 
different senses. The Court’s dynamic interpretation in some cases 
adapts the CAA to a new problem, that of global climate disruption. 
In other cases, the Court’s dynamic interpretation adapts the 
statute to elite political opinion favoring what Cass Sunstein calls 
the “cost-benefit state”—a state devoted to cost-benefit 
balancing—or to political opinion opposing regulation.21  
Part V evaluates the shift to dynamic statutory interpretation, 
which one sees in the previous decade. It argues that the problem 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 
2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012)). 
 20. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (stating that “near the close of the twentieth 
century . . . the ‘new textualism’ called . . . strong purposivism” into question). 
 21. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION 318 (2003). 
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many judges associate with purposivism—its supposed tendency 
to foster judicial opinions reflecting judges’ political views—has 
proven more pervasive in the recent era of dynamic statutory 
interpretation than in the 1970s, when the Court regularly gave 
substantial weight to statutory purpose. It examines the question 
of how best to carry out statutory adaptation in a way that does 
not undermine democracy and the rule of law; in particular, 
considering what role elite views should play in that adaptation. 
II. The Clean Air Act 
A. Key Statutory Features 
Congress enacted the modern CAA in 1970 in response to an 
environmental crisis that led to mass demonstrations and a broad 
consensus favoring strict environmental protection.22 The CAA’s 
stated goal is to protect public health and the environment, rather 
than to achieve a balance between environmental protection and 
competing considerations.23  
The CAA pursues this goal by establishing a comprehensive 
program of pollution control. It requires EPA to list pollutants that 
endanger public health and the environment.24 For ubiquitous 
pollutants, called “criteria pollutants,” the CAA operationalizes its 
goals by requiring EPA to promulgate and periodically revise 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), set at levels that 
protect public health and the environment with an adequate 
margin of safety.25 As the term “ambient” suggests, these 
                                                                                                     
 22. Luke W. Cole, Foreword: A Jeremiad on Environmental Justice and the 
Law, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. ix, xii (1995) (discussing mass demonstrations seeking 
environmental protection, such as Earth Day in 1970, which involved millions of 
people). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012). This paragraph defines the purpose as 
“to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote 
the public health and the productive capacity of its population.” Id. It expresses 
the view that clean air will not only protect public health but also make people 
more productive, because pollution-induced illness can increase absenteeism and 
harm productivity in the workplace. Id. 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2012). 
 25. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) 
(explaining that the CAA requires EPA to establish the NAAQS to protect public 
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standards apply to levels of pollution in the air surrounding us. To 
reduce levels of ambient pollution, many polluters must reduce 
their emissions. Accordingly, the CAA requires states to develop 
state implementation plans (SIPs), containing enforceable 
emissions limits for stationary sources (e.g., factories and power 
plants) emitting criteria pollutants and their precursors.26 These 
plans must contain standards adequate to secure attainment of the 
NAAQS, and EPA reviews the plans to make sure that they do.27 
Although the CAA primarily relies upon state regulation to achieve 
the NAAQS, it carves out a substantial federal role as well.28 EPA 
must establish New Source Performance Standards for major new 
and modified sources under § 111 of the CAA.29 The CAA also 
establishes a “technology-forcing” program of federal regulation of 
“mobile sources” such as cars and trucks, which includes 
regulation of fuel.30 
The CAA also operationalizes its health and environmental 
protection goal by requiring federal regulation of hazardous air 
pollutantsnon-criteria pollutants associated with very serious 
health effects such as cancer and birth defectsdesigned to protect 
public health with an “ample margin of safety.”31 This program did 
not work very well under the 1970 and 1977 CAA Amendments, 
primarily because EPA listed only eight pollutants for regulation.32 
So Congress itself listed 191 hazardous air pollutants for 
mandatory federal regulation in the 1990 Amendments.33 The 
                                                                                                     
health with an adequate margin of safety based on health effects information in 
the “criteria” documents required by the CAA). 
 26. See Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 65 (1975) 
(discussing the CAA requirement that states develop and submit plans to 
implement and enforce the NAAQS). 
 27. See id. at 6567, n.2 (characterizing the requirement that the plans 
secure attainment as “the heart of the 1970 Amendments” and citing the language 
requiring EPA review). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 75217589. 
 31. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that the CAA required regulation to protect public health from 
pollutants increasing mortality or serious illness). 
 32. Id.   
 33. Id. 
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1990 Amendments require a round of technology-based regulation 
of major sources of hazardous air pollution based on maximizing 
feasible emission reductions.34 Congress did not, however, abandon 
the goal of fully protecting public health, requiring a second round 
of regulation designed to protect public health with an ample 
margin of safety from any residual risk, thereby largely mirroring 
the standard setting approach of the 1970 Amendments in a second 
phase of contemplated regulation.35  
The CAA introduced an enforcement innovation consistent 
with its effort to vigorously pursue the goal of fully protecting 
public health and the environment in spite of likely resistance by 
regulated industries and government officials influenced by 
them—the citizen suit. It empowered “any person,” including 
individual citizens, to sue violators of the CAA and to seek judicial 
review of EPA’s implementing decisions.36  
The CAA became increasingly lengthy and complex over time. 
The 1970 Amendments established the statute as perhaps the 
most complex and lengthy statute other than the Internal Revenue 
Code.37 In 1977, Congress added complex provisions requiring a 
program for Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of air 
quality in areas that had attained the NAAQS, in order to prevent 
them from becoming nonattainment areas and to preserve 
visibility in the national parks.38 The PSD program requires new 
and modified “major sources” to use Best Available Control 
Technology (BACT) to limit their emissions.39 The Congress 
                                                                                                     
 34. See id. (explaining that these standards are to be based on the 
“maximum achievable control technology”). 
 35. See id. at 1080 (noting that the second stage of regulation is 
“health-based” as it was prior to the 1990 Amendments). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a), 7607(b). 
 37. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, On Explaining the Development of ‘Emissions 
Trading’ in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation, 7 L. & POL’Y 447, 451 (1985) 
(characterizing the CAA as “one of the more complicated statutes yet produced by 
a modern industrial state”). 
 38. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the CAA’s provisions “virtually 
swim before one’s eyes”); Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: 
Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (discussing 
the PSD program’s structure and goals). 
 39. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 309 (2014) 
(describing the PSD program’s BACT provisions); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
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enacting the 1990 Amendments sought to correct EPA’s and the 
states’ failure to achieve the CAA’s health protection goals through 
extremely detailed instructions with respect to both hazardous and 
criteria air pollutants.40 It also added new titles addressing acid 
rain and stratospheric ozone depletion.41 Furthermore, it adapted 
the statute to reflect elite opinion favoring emissions trading, by 
creating a trading program regulating sulfur dioxide in the acid 
rain title and by authorizing market-based mechanisms in SIPs.42 
Finally, it required that owners and operators of major sources 
obtain an operating permit detailing how they would comply with 
all of the CAA requirements applicable to each source in order to 
improve compliance and enforcement.43 All of these amendments 
created a broad federal role in securing clean air and passed with 
overwhelming bipartisan support.44 
B. The Evolution of Philosophy Toward Clean Air 
The modern CAA reflects a particular environmental and 
health protection philosophy. Senator Edmund Muskie, a major 
architect of the CAA, believed that the government should make 
sure that the public has clean and safe air to breathe.45 Although 
the CAA contains numerous provisions that require consideration 
of cost (for example, in the technology-based standard setting 
provisions that one finds throughout much of the CAA), ultimately 
the CAA reflects a philosophy of giving primacy to protection of the 
                                                                                                     
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 47073 (2004) (describing the PSD program). 
 40. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412, 7511 (2012). 
 41. Id. §§ 76517651o, 76717671q. 
 42. Id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(A), 76517651e. 
 43. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 309 (noting that Title V requires a 
“comprehensive operating permit”). 
 44. See CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: S. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 324, 
136 CONG. REC. 36,138 (1990) (recording that the Amendments passed the Senate 
8910); CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: H.R. ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 525, 136 
CONG. REC. 35,084 (1990) (recording that the Amendments passed the House 
40125). 
 45. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 258 (1976) (describing the 
government’s responsibility as determining what is necessary to “protect the 
health of persons” (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 3290102 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Muskie))). 
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public health and the environment.46 Indeed, the Senate Report 
accompanying the 1970 Amendments make it clear that owners of 
polluting facilities should figure out how to operate without 
harming public health and the environment or shut down.47 Thus 
the CAA reflects a technology-forcing philosophy—a view that 
given sufficiently strict standards, polluters would figure out how 
to operate without damaging public health and accomplish feats 
that appeared infeasible.48 The primacy afforded public health 
protection is congruent with a rights-based view of environmental 
protection that one often finds reflected in the common law, 
especially in earlier cases.49  
This rights-based view, however, attracted criticism, which 
gained strength during the 1980s. During the 1970s, Richard 
Posner helped establish law and economics as an overarching 
framework to guide legal decision-making.50 He claimed that law 
often aims to achieve economic efficiency and argued for the 
                                                                                                     
 46. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), with id. §§ 7401(b)(1), 
7409(b)(1), 7412(f)(2)(B).  
 47. See Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 259 (noting that the Senate committee 
determined that air pollution sources must either meet the health-based 
standards or “be closed down” (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 23 (1970))). 
 48. See id. at 25859 (concluding that the entire Congress demanded 
attainment of the NAAQS within three years “even if attainment does not appear 
feasible”). 
 49. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 233, 23335 (1990) (characterizing CAA § 112’s language as creating a right 
to a risk-free environment); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the 
Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 141012 
(suggesting that National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the CAA reflect 
a rights-based approach to addressing power imbalances); see also Mary Jane 
Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic 
Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 105, 108 
(2006) (describing risk-based approaches to environmental harm as “absolutist”); 
David M. Driesen, The Ends and Means of Pollution Control: Toward a Positive 
Theory of Environmental Law, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 57, 6668 (discussing the 
risk-based protective goals in the CAA and other statutes); see, e.g., Georgia v. 
Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (granting an injunction of air pollution 
constituting a nuisance as of right at the behest of a sovereign state); Boomer v. 
Atl. Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223 (1970) (noting that traditionally New York 
did not balance equities in deciding whether to enjoin a nuisance, before deciding 
to balance equities in the case before it). 
 50. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
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normative desirability of economic efficiency.51 Cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) of regulation can, in principle, weed out 
economically inefficient rules.52 The law-and-economics movement 
strongly influenced lawyers and other policy-making elites and 
came to exercise a great deal of influence over law, including 
environmental law.53 Regulated corporations championed CBA 
from early on, recognizing its potential to delay and weaken 
regulation.54  
In 1982, Ronald Reagan promulgated an executive order 
demanding CBA of major regulations.55 This order also ended the 
independence of EPA, which Richard Nixon had helped establish 
in order to implement the rights-based view of environmental law 
reflected in the CAA and other major environmental statutes of the 
1970s.56 The executive order did this by authorizing the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of 
Management Budget to oversee EPA implementation of the CAA 
and other environmental statutes.57  
                                                                                                     
 51. See id. at 18 (suggesting that judges employ economic reasoning, albeit 
without explicitly invoking economic concepts); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical 
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980) (arguing that economic efficiency has value 
because it maximizes wealth); cf. David M. Driesen & Robin Malloy, Critiques of 
Law and Economics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 300, 30003 
(2017) (Francisco Parisi ed., 2017) (briefly reviewing major critiques of this claim). 
 52. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, 
and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 55 (2005) [hereinafter Driesen, 
Distributing Costs] (noting that “allocatively efficient regulation requires that the 
cost of environmental regulation equal the benefits derived from it”). 
 53. Id. at 13. 
 54. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 14950 (1991) (noting that 
“regulatees” support CBA). 
 55. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
 56. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office 
Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 127, 13132 (1991) (discussing Nixon’s support for an independent 
EPA in preference to a proposal calculated to balance development and 
environmental interests). 
 57. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, § 3 (1981) (detailing the steps 
needed to obtain OMB approval of agency action). 
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Over the years, elite policy experts came to embrace CBA and 
many of the attitudes that often came with it. Legal scholars at 
elite law schools, for example, associated CBA not only with 
economic efficiency, but also with enhanced rationality, better 
priority setting, and improvement of “overall well-being.”58 These 
views enjoy little support from environmental law professors, who 
have grave concerns about the application of CBA to 
difficult-to-quantify environmental effects and who tend to support 
the values embedded in the original statutes.59  
Law and economics usually treats law as being about 
balancing costs and benefits. Its proponents see rational 
environmental regulation as a product of some sort of balancing 
and identify CBA with balancing. They often treat a law aimed at 
a very specific goal as likely to trigger unintended consequences 
and as creating unhealthy “tunnel vision.” Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s academic work fits within this elite tradition and offers 
perhaps the best articulation of concerns about tunnel vision and 
priority setting derived from a view of environmental law as just 
another form of economic resource allocation.60 Thus, elite opinion, 
defined as the opinion of policy experts and business leaders, 
shifted toward a balancing approach during the 1980s. 
Political opinion, defined as the opinion of elected politicians, 
shifted more slowly. Although Congress appeared initially hostile 
to CBA, by the mid-1990s it enacted a law basically ratifying the 
                                                                                                     
 58. See Driesen, Distributing Costs, supra note 52, at 6066 (reviewing these 
arguments).  
 59. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (critiquing pricing 
environmental benefits and claiming that some things are priceless); DOUGLAS A. 
KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR 
OBJECTIVITY (2010) (arguing that CBA ducks essential normative question that 
environmental law has forthrightly addressed); MCGARITY, supra note 54; SIDNEY 
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 5155 (2003) (suggesting that feasibility regulation avoids 
serious economic disruption while declining to treat injury and death as fungible 
like a dollar cost). 
 60. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 1019 (1993) (discussing a problem of “tunnel vision” and 
recommending better priority setting as the cure); Lisa Heinzerling, Political 
Science, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 461 (1995) (reading Breyer’s book as “most of all, 
a call for better prioritization”). 
SUPREME COURT CLEAN AIR ACT 1795 
reform contained in the executive orders.61 Furthermore, while 
initially a Republican reform, Democratic presidents promulgated 
executive orders retaining OIRA review and CBA as part of the 
regulatory structure.62 Thus, by the mid-1990s both elite and 
political opinion had shifted away from supporting rights-based 
environmental protection toward support of a “balanced” approach 
of some kind.63  
Although politicians and other elites have moved toward 
cost-benefit balancing and skepticism toward regulation, public 
opinion has remained much more stable in support of the CAA’s 
original philosophy. From 1994 to 2016, between 71% and 80% of 
the public indicated that we should do whatever it takes to protect 
the environment.64 
                                                                                                     
 61. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 
109 Stat. 48 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2018)). 
 62. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 
1993) (stating that a regulation’s benefits should “justify” the costs); see also Lisa 
Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
1457, 1462 (2014) (critiquing the views of President Obama’s first head of OIRA, 
Cass Sunstein).  
 63. See Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market 
Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and 
Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 132930 (1996) (noting that by the time of the 
Clinton Administration, a majority in Congress no longer had a positive view of 
environmental statutes). 
 64. On eleven occasions from 19942016, the Pew Research Center asked 
respondents whether “[t]he country should do whatever it takes to protect the 
environment” or “[t]he country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the 
environment.” PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MARCH 2016 POLITICAL SURVEY (2016), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/2016/03/03-31-2016-Political-topline-for-
release.pdf. Support for the former option ranged from 7180%, support for the 
latter from 1525%. Id. When asked to weigh a tradeoff between environmental 
protection and economic growth, popular majorities usually still favor 
environmental protection, though by a narrower margin. Environment, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In twenty-nine polls conducted 
from 19842016, a majority of respondents supported environmental protection 
over economic growth in eighteen and a plurality did so in another six. Id. Only 
five times, all from 20092013, did a plurality favor economic growth. Id. 
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C.  Global Climate Disruption 
By the 1990s, a new environmental problem had become 
prominent—global climate disruption. Greenhouse gas emissions, 
mostly from burning fossil fuels, have warmed the earth’s average 
mean surface temperature and will increase that temperature 
further unless emissions are eliminated.65 Moreover, this warming 
triggers very serious consequences: increasingly severe extreme 
weather events, rising seas, inundation of coastal areas, killer heat 
waves, drought, the spread of infectious diseases, destruction of 
ecosystems, and the elimination of many species figure among its 
myriad effects.66 Because this problem stems from greenhouse gas 
emissions around the world, avoiding dangerous climate 
disruption requires global effort.67  
In 1990, Congress required study of global climate disruption68 
but did not include specific provisions explicitly establishing 
standards for greenhouse gas emissions.69 The 1990 Amendments 
do contain specific provisions to tackle a related global problem, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, requiring a phase-out of the major 
ozone depleting chemicals to implement, and in some ways go 
beyond, the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, 
which the United States ratified in 1988.70 But no international 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 509 (2007) (noting that in 1990 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that human 
activities are increasing the temperature). 
 66. See id. at 521–23 (referencing the scientific reports documenting these 
consequences).  
 67. See id. at 545 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that 80% of greenhouse 
gas emissions “originate outside the United States”).  
 68. See Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 
3096 (establishing a program “aimed at understanding and responding to global 
change, including the cumulative effects of human activities and natural 
processes on the environment, to promote discussions toward international 
protocols in global change research”); see also Global Climate Protection Act, Pub. 
L. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331, Title XI (codified in note following 15 U.S.C. § 2901) 
(directing EPA to propose a “coordinated national policy on climate change” and 
to make diplomatic efforts to address it).  
 69. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2012) (defining welfare effects to include effects 
on climate).  
 70. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 (U.S. ratification Apr. 21, 1988). 
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treaty addressing global climate disruption existed in 1990, and 
the science was just becoming established.  
During the 1990s, however, the global community established 
a treaty regime to address global climate disruption.71 At the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992, many countries signed on to the United Nation’s Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention), which 
the United States subsequently ratified.72 This agreement provides 
a set of principles and goals for addressing climate disruption, but 
does not contain binding obligations to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.73 In 1997, the Conference of the Parties to the 
Framework Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Framework Convention, which requires developed countries to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.74 The United States, however, 
never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and President George W. Bush 
expressly repudiated it in 2001.75 This failure to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol suggests a significant change in political climate, as the 
United States throughout the 1970s and 1980s regularly led 
international efforts to combat serious international 
environmental problems.76  
In 2008, however, it appeared that the United States would at 
least follow other nations’ lead and address global climate 
disruption. In that year’s presidential election, both Republican 
candidate John McCain and his rival Barack Obama favored action 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 508–09 (noting that the IPCC “published 
its first comprehensive report” in 1990 and that President Bush signed the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992). 
 72. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (U.S. ratification Oct. 15, 1992). 
  73. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 455 (mentioning the Framework 
Convention’s goal and principles, while recognizing its lack of binding emission 
reduction commitments). 
 74. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (entered into force Feb. 16, 
2005). 
 75.  Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 
Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 444 (Mar. 13, 2001). 
 76. See, e.g., RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1998) (describing the Reagan Administration’s 
international leadership in addressing stratospheric ozone depletion).  
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on global climate disruption.77 And, consistent with this bipartisan 
consensus, the House passed comprehensive legislation mandating 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions primarily through an 
emissions trading program shortly after President Obama’s 
inauguration.78 This legislation, however, failed to pass the 
Senate.79  
Since then, the political landscape has shifted in ways that 
make the political climate today radically different from the 
political climate that existed when Congress created and amended 
the CAA and even from the climate prevailing in 2008. Opposition 
to action on global climate disruption has become an article of faith 
among Republican politicians and presidential candidates.80 Thus, 
political opinion has recently departed markedly from educated 
elite opinion, which tends to favor some action on global climate 
disruption in light of the strong evidence of significant harm, even 
though it favors basing that action on CBA.  
This shift in political opinion made it impossible to pass new 
legislation to address climate disruption even after 2008. 
Accordingly, President Obama addressed it primarily under the 
CAA.81 President Trump, however, declared climate disruption a 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Michael B. Gerrard, McCain vs. Obama on Environment, Energy, 
and Resources, 23 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Fall 2008, at 3, 4. (noting that both John 
McCain and Barack Obama supported cap-and-trade legislation to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
 78. See MARK HOLT & GENE WHITNEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40643, 
GREENHOUSE GAS LEGISLATION: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2454 AS REPORTED 
BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE (2009) (analyzing the bill 
that passed in the House). 
 79. See Kassie Siegel et al., Strong Law, Timid Implementation: How the 
EPA Can Apply the Full Force of the Clean Air Act to Address the Climate Crisis, 
30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 186 (2012) (mentioning the “defeat of 
economy-wide climate legislation in the 111th Congress”). 
 80. See id. at 186 (describing the Congress elected in 2010 as “openly hostile 
to any form of greenhouse regulation”); see also Art Swift, Americans Again Pick 
Environment Over Economic Growth, GALLUP (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/168017/americans-again-pick-environment-
economic-growth.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (indicating that about two-thirds 
of Democrats but only one-third of Republicans would give environmental 
protection priority over economic growth in 2014 and noting that this is the 
largest partisan gulf since 1997) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 81. See Uma Outka, The Obama Administration’s Clean Air Act Legacy and 
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hoax and seeks to unwind Obama Administration initiatives to 
address the issue.82  
D. Summary of Background 
In sum, the CAA reflects a rights-based view of environmental 
law that enjoyed broad bipartisan and public support for at least 
twenty years. Since its enactment, however, this view has become 
less popular among both elites and politicians.83 In addition, EPA 
and thus the courts have recently applied the CAA to a new 
problem not fully anticipated in 1970 or even 1990—the problem 
of global climate disruption.84 These background realities invite 
consideration of whether the Court has dynamically interpreted 
the statute either to adapt to a new problem or to adapt to new 
attitudes among elites or politicians. That question requires some 
consideration of broader judicial trends in statutory 
interpretation, which also may influence cases’ outcomes.  
III. Purpose, Text, and Judge-Made Law: The Court’s 
Interpretation of the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 2004 
A. Purpose and Text in Statutory Interpretation 
A venerable canon of statutory construction urges courts to 
construe statutes in a way that effectuates their purposes.85 
                                                                                                     
the UNFCC, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109, 117–18 (2016) (explaining that 
several of President Obama’s environmental goals “have proven integrally 
connected by the Administration’s regulatory agenda under the CAA”).  
 82. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Donald Trump Could Put Climate Change on 
Court for Danger Zone, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/donald-trump-climate-
change.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 83. Siegel et al., supra note 79. 
 84. Supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 85. See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58:6 (7th ed. 2011) (referring to construction to 
realize a statute’s purpose as “ancient wisdom”). 
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Allegiance to this canon, however, has waxed and waned over 
time.86  
At the time of the 1970 Amendments, the Court took this 
canon quite seriously.87 By the mid-1980s, however, the Court 
began to criticize reliance on purpose.88 The Court expressed doubt 
about purpose’s utility because it increasingly saw statutes as 
embodying complex legislative compromises not aimed at a single 
overarching purpose.89 This view mirrors public choice theory, 
which understands legislation as embodying a compromise among 
special interests, rather than as reflecting rational pursuit of some 
public interest goal.90 Justice Scalia later articulated anxiety that 
under a purposeful approach judges would construe statutes to 
reflect their own views of what the statutes’ purposes should be.91  
The standard account suggests that the Court embraced 
textualism as an alternative to purposivism.92 Justice Scalia in 
particular saw textualism as offering a means of principled 
interpretation to constrain judges’ tendency to interpret statutes 
                                                                                                     
 86. See David M. Driesen, Purposeless Construction, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
97, 115–17 (2013) (discussing the Court’s decreased emphasis on congressional 
purpose when interpreting statutory meaning).  
 87. See Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 149, 183 (2001) (noting that the Warren Court frequently “tailored general 
commands to their background purposes”).  
 88. See Driesen, supra note 86, at 111 (identifying the decline of purpose 
with the Rehnquist Court). 
 89. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per 
curiam) (stating that no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs so that one 
cannot assume that conforming a statute to its purpose reflects congressional 
intent); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 
361, 373–74 (1986) (explaining that reliance on purpose can conflict with 
legislative compromises regarding the means of accomplishing statutory 
purposes). 
 90. See Driesen, supra note 86, at 119 (noting that the emphasis on 
legislative compromise found in Dimension Financial Corp. and other cases 
“echoes public choice theorists’ claims”). 
 91. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 117 (2007) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that purposeful construction 
encourages judges to assume that Congress “must have meant” what judges think 
it “should have meant”).  
 92. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 218–29 (offering a subtle account of the 
rise of textualism and the receding of reliance on legislative history to uncover 
both specific and general intent).  
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in accordance with their views of sensible law.93 Judicial 
proponents of textualism did not wholly reject considering either 
purpose or statutory context as tools for resolving textual 
ambiguity, but they tended to give purpose less weight than their 
colleagues and often did not recognize ambiguity that their 
colleagues found in statutory text.94 
Scholars have extensively debated the use of purpose and text 
in statutory interpretation and those interested in that debate can 
refer to materials cited in the notes.95 But two questions merit 
some emphasis here. First of all, scholars debate the question of 
whether giving weight to purpose leads to judicial activism.96 
Second, scholars debate whether textualism constrains judicial 
politics and provides definitive guidance to resolving Supreme 
Court cases.97 This case study provides some evidence relevant to 
these debates. 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Zuni, 550 U.S. at 109–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contrasting 
“policy-driven interpretation” with interpretation based on text); Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
521 (characterizing himself as one who often finds that a statute’s meaning is 
“apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws”). 
 94. See Manning, supra note 20, at 17 (noting that “textualists” use purpose 
to clarify ambiguities). 
 95. See infra notes 96–97. 
 96. Compare W. Matt Morgan, What Did They Mean?: How Principles of 
Group Communication Can Inform Original Meaning Jurisprudence and Address 
the Problem of Collective Intent, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1215, 1224 (2015) 
(finding that purposivism is especially susceptible to judicial activism), Victoria 
Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the 
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 
1176 (2011) (arguing that purposivism’s reliance on legislative history increases 
the potential for judicial activism), and Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the 
Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court and the Legislative Compromise, 44 
EMORY L.J. 117, 131 (1995) (equating purposivism with “judicial lawmaking”), 
with Matthew B. Todd, Avoiding Judicial In-Activism: The Use of Legislative 
History to Determine Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 46 WASHBURN 
L.J. 189, 189 (2006) (suggesting that failure to use purpose to understand 
legislative intent can lead to “impermissible judicial activism”).  
 97. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 230–34 (claiming that textualism does 
not provide more constraint than competing methodologies); Jane S. Schachter, 
Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011) (discussing Justice 
Scalia’s avoidance of interpretations that he thinks have unreasonable normative 
consequences); William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (noting that 
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B. Text and Purpose: 19701980 
Many of the cases decided in the 1970s reflect careful attention 
to text and consideration of purpose. Moreover, the consideration 
of purpose was fairly broad, encompassing not just the statute’s 
overall health protection purpose, but an understanding of the 
structural elements put in place to achieve that purpose.98 And the 
Court carefully considered the underlying philosophy behind the 
statute in the first cases to reach it.99 Furthermore, in most of the 
cases considered during this period, the Court granted certiorari 
in order to resolve conflicts among the circuits.100 
In the first modern CAA case to reach the high court, Train v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,101 the Court recognized 
the structural shift reflected in the 1970 Amendments. In 
particular, it recognized that the CAA had sharply increased the 
federal role and made state achievement of the NAAQS mandatory 
in response to disappointment with previous state efforts to 
improve air quality.102 It colorfully described the 1970 
Amendments as “taking a stick to the States” in response to their 
                                                                                                     
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner claim that textualism will curb judicial 
tendencies to read their own policy preferences into statutes whilst critics of the 
new textualism doubt text’s constraining power); William N. Eskridge, 
Textualism: The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1535 (1998) (reviewing 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997)) (arguing that textualism does not constrain a willful judge’s options).  
 98. See infra notes 101–112 and accompanying text. 
 99. See infra notes 101–112 and accompanying text. 
 100. See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 102–03 n.2 (1977) (discussing varying 
positions among the circuit courts but vacating the decisions below in light of 
EPA’s intention to revise the regulations at issue); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 
167, 177 (1976) (stating that the Court granted the petition for certiorari “to 
resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals”); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 
255 (1976) (stating that the Court “granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among 
the Circuits”); Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 71–75 (1975) 
(discussing the “disparity among the Courts of Appeals”); cf. Harrison v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 586 (1980) (stating that the Court granted certiorari 
“because of the importance” of the issue); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 
434 U.S. 275, 278 (1978) (not suggesting a circuit split).  
 101. 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
 102. See id. at 64 (stating that “the response of the State to these 
manifestations of increasing congressional concern with air pollution was 
disappointing”). 
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failure to make progress when attainment of the NAAQS was 
optional.103 The Train Court, after carefully parsing statutory 
language and examining the legislative history, statutory 
structure, and the “history of congressional efforts to control 
pollution,” upheld an EPA variance procedure that only permitted 
variances when they do not interfere with the CAA’s goal of 
obtaining compliance with the NAAQS.104  
The Court linked Train’s understanding of the CAA’s 
structural reform to the philosophy underlying the CAA in a case 
decided two years later, Union Electric Co. v. EPA.105 The Union 
Electric Court held that concerns about economic or technological 
infeasibility cannot provide a basis for rejecting a SIP.106 It 
squarely relied on the CAA’s history and purpose to justify this 
conclusion.107 The Court characterized the 1970 Amendments as “a 
drastic remedy” to a serious air pollution problem.108 Thus, it 
viewed the statute as pursuing a particular public purpose—
environmental protection—which had become important, not as a 
general welter of special interest bargains or an all things 
considered balancing exercise. It viewed the requirement that 
states formulate and implement plans to achieve the NAAQS as 
“of a ‘technology-forcing character’” in that it would require 
“regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that might 
at the time appear to be economically or technologically 
infeasible.”109 The Court, however, derived this reading of the 
statute in part from careful consideration of the text governing 
SIPs.110 That text mentions a host of factors that EPA may 
                                                                                                     
 103. Id. 
104.  Id. at 63; Manning, supra note 20, at 10–11 (noting that “strong 
purposivists” derive purpose from a statute’s tenor, its historical context, and 
“statements in legislative history”). 
105. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).  
 106. See id. at 256 (holding claims of economic and technological feasibility 
“wholly foreign” to EPA review of a SIP). 
 107. See id. at 257 (stating that the requirements were “expressly designed to 
force regulated sources to develop pollution control devises that might at the time 
appear to be economically or technologilly [sic] infeasible”).  
 108. Id. at 256.  
 109. Id. at 257. 
 110. See id. at 257–58. 
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consider, but nowhere mentions cost or technological feasibility.111 
The Court inferred an intent not to authorize consideration of cost 
from the relevant provision’s failure to mention it.112 
The Court buttressed this ruling with careful consideration of 
the legislative history, which showed a clear philosophical decision 
to give public health primacy. In particular, it cited a statement by 
Senator Muskie and a Senate Report asserting that public health 
was more important than feasibility, and therefore that polluters 
will be asked to do “what seems to be impossible at the present 
time,”113 and must meet health-based standards or “be closed 
down.”114  
Thus, the Act’s earliest decisions grappled with the CAA’s 
philosophy, its goal, its structure, and its language. And no Justice 
wrote a dissent in either case, not even Justice William Rehnquist, 
the Court’s leading skeptic of federal regulation at the time.115  
The evolution of the CAA leading to the 1977 Amendments, 
however, created a misalignment of purpose and structure with 
text, which divided the Court in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United 
States.116 The 1970 Amendments authorize promulgation and 
enforcement of “emission standards” for hazardous air pollutants, 
including criminal enforcement for “knowing” violations.117 EPA 
soon discovered that it was not possible to enforce a numerical 
emission limit when it was not feasible to measure emissions.118 In 
regulating asbestos emissions from building demolition, EPA 
addressed this problem by crafting a “work practice” standarda 
requirement to take a particular action limiting pollutioninstead 
                                                                                                     
 111. See id. at 257. 
 112. See id. (stating that the basis for the Administrator’s considerations 
“must be among the eight criteria”).  
 113. Id. at 258–59 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 32901–32902 (1970) (statement of 
Senator Muskie)).  
 114. Id. at 259 (citing S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 2–3 (1970)).  
 115. Cf. Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 421 U.S. 60, 99 (1975) (indicating 
that Justice Douglas dissented silently from Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the 
Court). 
 116. 434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
 117. Id. at 276–77 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7413).  
 118. See id. at 286–87 (discussing EPA’s conclusion that it “could not regulate 
emissions” from demolition of buildings that released asbestos). 
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of a performance standard requiring a specific level of emissions.119 
Congress accepted this innovation in the 1977 Amendments, 
explicitly authorizing promulgation of work practice standards, 
but failed to update the criminal enforcement provision to 
explicitly reflect the change.120  The Adamo Court held that EPA 
could not criminally enforce a work practice standard, quite 
plausibly (from a textual standpoint) construing the term 
“emission limit” as only encompassing performance standards.121 
Four Justices filed dissenting opinions.122 Three of them argued 
that the defendant’s claim amounted to a request for judicial 
review of rulemaking through an enforcement proceeding, which 
the CAA’s judicial review provision prohibits.123 Justice John Paul 
Stevens argued that the term “emissions standard” need not be 
construed to exclude a “work practice standard” and should not be, 
because such a construction conflicts with the statute’s structure 
and purpose by making a valid standard unenforceable.124 
Congress promptly amended the statute to overrule this example 
of textualism trumping purpose and structure, thereby suggesting 
that Justice Stevens’ view of Congressional intent was correct.125  
                                                                                                     
 119. See id. (explaining how EPA chose to regulate certain work practices 
when it found emission limits impracticable). 
 120. See id. at 306 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress 
confirmed EPA’s authority to promulgate work practice standards in the 1977 
Amendments but did not amend the enforcement provision); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413 (2012). 
 121. See Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 276–77, 285–86 (explaining that 
the CAA made “emission standards” criminally enforceable and distinguishes 
between quantitative emission standards and orders to employ a particular 
pollution control technique). 
 122. Id. at 291, 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 123. See id. at 291 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s view 
subjects the EPA Administrator to judicial review in a criminal proceeding, 
contrary to a statutory bar on such review). 
 124. See id. at 293–94 (Stevens, J, dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
adopting a construction preventing effective enforcement of standards regulating 
hazardous air pollutants and stating that “nothing in the . . . 1970 
statute . . . compels so crippling an interpretation”). 
 125. See United States v. Ethyl Corp., 576 F. Supp. 80, 82 (M.D. La. 1983), 
rev’d on other grounds, 761 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1070 
(1986) (recognizing that Congress has superseded Adamo). Justice Scalia in a 
different context rejected the idea that a congressional override implies that the 
Court erred, by suggesting that the “will of the Congress” overriding the 
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In a case not implicating the CAA’s fundamental purposes, 
text controlled the outcome on its own. In Harrison v. PPG 
Industries, Inc.,126 the Court held that a provision authorizing 
direct review of “any other final” agency action in the court of 
appeals granted the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
jurisdiction to review an agency letter interpreting a rule.127 
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissented primarily based on 
concern about expansion of direct court of appeals review of 
informal agency action.128 But during this period, the CAA’s text 
usually trumped judicial policy preferences, even the preference 
about the organization of judicial review that Justices Rehnquist 
and Stevens articulated. 
The Court, however, sometimes failed to follow statutory 
purpose because doing so would conflict with clear statement rules 
reflecting constitutional values. The Adamo Court relied to a small 
degree on the rule of lenity, which serves constitutional due 
process values by requiring clear statements about what triggers 
criminal liability.129 In Hancock v. Train,130 the Court relied much 
more heavily on a rule requiring clear statement of an intent to 
require state regulation of a federal instrumentality in holding 
that the CAA did not require federal facilities to obtain an 
                                                                                                     
legislation does not reveal the will of the Congress enacting the law. See W. Va. 
Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n.7 (1991), superseded by statute as 
recognized in Landgraff v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994). But if the 
Congress overriding the statute shares the values of the enacting Congress, its 
override does provide evidence that the Court erred. The Congresses from 1970 
through 1990 shared a common purpose in seeking rather strong environmental 
protection, so that the override of Adamo probably does indicate that the Court 
misconstrued the statute in the first instance, especially as Adamo’s policy logic 
seems so at odds with congressional purpose over a long period of time.     
126.  446 U.S. 578 (1980). 
 127. See id. at 586–88 (holding that the word “any” precluded acceptance of a 
reading confining direct review in the court of appeals to cases involving a 
contemporaneous administrative record compiled after notice and an opportunity 
for a hearing). 
 128. See id. at 600 (discussing this expansion of jurisdiction and the 
difficulties it will create). 
 129. See Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, supra note 
97, at 575 (noting the rule of lenity’s links to Due Process). 
 130. 426 U.S. 167 (1976). 
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operating permit from the State.131 Congress promptly superseded 
this holding with a statutory amendment (just as it did after 
Adamo).132 
Thus, the Court in the 1970s tended to follow statutory 
purpose and text and usually issued unanimous or nearly 
unanimous opinions, as indicated in Table 1. The Court also freely 
relied upon structure and legislative history.133 When the Court 
made rulings that undermined statutory purpose, Congress 
superseded its decisions, thereby suggesting that the Court got it 
wrong.134 And the Court only acted contrary to statutory purpose 
where specific text or a constitutional value pushed in that 
direction.135 The only case to produce a 5–4 decision, Adamo, 
generated a split because the most natural reading of the relevant 
statutory text conflicted with statutory purpose and any sensible 
policy.136 In sum, this decade featured one unanimous holding;137 
two with a single dissent, one of which was overridden by 
Congress;138 one with two dissents;139 and one divided 5–4, which 
was subsequently overridden by Congress.140  
                                                                                                     
 131. See id. at 178–79 (explaining the basis for this clear statement rule). 
 132. See United States v. Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d 1273, 1280 n.22 
(3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the 1977 Amendments superseded Hancock). 
 133. See Vermeule, supra note 87, at 183 (2001) (noting that the Warren Court 
frequently “tailored general commands to their background purposes”). 
 134. See generally Eskridge, supra note 8; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging 
on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil-Rights Game, 79 CALIF. 
L. REV. 613, 683 (1991); Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional 
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 
942 (2012); Kathryn A. Eidmann, Comment, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of 
Narrow Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971, 979 (2008). 
 135. See supra sources cited note 134. 
 136. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
 137. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
 138. Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Hancock v. 
Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976). 
 139. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980). 
 140. See Adamo, 434 U.S. at 276 (providing the vote count); supra note 125 
and accompanying text (discussing the Congressional override). 
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 141. 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
 142.  421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
 143.  426 U.S. 167 (1976). 
 144.  446 U.S. 578 (1980). 
 145.  434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
 146.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 147.  476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 148.  478 U.S. 546 (1986). 
 149.  463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
 150.  483 U.S. 711 (1987). 
 

























                                                                                                     
 151.  496 U.S. 530 (1990). 
 152.  531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 153.  541 U.S. 246 (2004). 
 154.  540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
 155.  564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
 156.  572 U.S. 489 (2014). 
 157.  No. 03-1261, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11282 (D.C. Cir. May 9, 2007). 
 158.  573 U.S. 302 (2014). The characterization of Utility Air Regulatory Group 
v. EPA as divided 5-4 is based on its resolution of the question of whether the 
CAA’s PSD and Title V permit programs apply to greenhouse gas emissions from 
sources already regulated under the BACT program. See id. At 331-33, 343-44 
(majority and dissenting opinions). 
 159.  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
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These cases generally suggest a Court genuinely engaged in 
trying to faithfully implement congressional decisions. 
Purposivism seems to have led the Court to decisions that often 
followed the CAA’s philosophy. Our reading of these decisions’ 
style as blending text and purpose comports with William 
Eskridge’s account of the Burger Court's tendencies across a 
broader range of cases.160 
C. The Decline of Purposivism and the Rise of Judicial 
Policymaking in the 1980s 
The 1980s saw the decline of explicit purposivism, but 
contrary to standard accounts, textualism did not immediately 
take its place. Instead, many of the Court’s CAA decisions during 
this decade evince a judicial pursuit of policy goals that are 
unmoored from statutory text and purpose.161 Indeed, almost all of 
them form part of a body of transstatutory case law that creates a 
judicially crafted common law on attorneys’ fees.162 This change 
produced rulings that often followed the conservative leanings of 
the Rehnquist Court, but stood in some tension with the CAA’s 
philosophy.163 Also, unlike the Hancock case (and to some extent, 
Adamo), the common law principles guiding the 1980s decisions 
lack a constitutional foundation.164 
In order to make citizen suits and judicial review financially 
viable, the CAA authorizes a court to award attorneys’ fees 
“whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.”165 An 
attorney fee case reached the Supreme Court after the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that an award was 
                                                                                                     
 160. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 219–20 (noting that the Burger Court 
revived plain meaning but checked legislative history to confirm it and to 
understand statutory purpose). 
 161.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law:  Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 
596 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to statutory 
interpretation). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. at 595–97. 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2012). 
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appropriate, even though the environmental petitioners seeking 
the award did not prevail on the merits.166 The Supreme Court 
reversed, in a 5–4 decision, holding that an award of attorney fees 
is not appropriate absent some success on the merits.167 Neither 
the majority nor the dissent discussed the relationship between 
attorney fees and the protection of public health, although the 
dissent did mention congressional intent to encourage public 
interest litigation.168 
In order to reach its conclusion, the majority wrenched a single 
word, “appropriate,” out of its statutory context to create room for 
Supreme Court common law policymaking.169 The entire sentence 
in which the word “appropriate” appears does not literally permit 
the result the majority reached.170 For that sentence does not 
require that the award be appropriate; it only requires that a court 
determine that the award is appropriate, and a court—the D.C. 
Circuit—had done so.171 The Supreme Court, however, treated the 
word “appropriate” as authorizing the Supreme Court to fashion a 
general rule about when fees are appropriate and based its 
decision on a background legal principle disfavoring fee-shifting, 
which it had previously identified with a longstanding tradition in 
a case arising under the Mineral Leasing Act and the National 
Environmental Policy Act.172 The dissent, however, advocated a 
                                                                                                     
 166. See Ruckelshaus v. EPA, 463 U.S. 680, 681–82 (1983) (noting that the 
court of appeals awarded $45,000 to the Sierra Club and $46,000 to the 
Environmental Defense Fund even though they did not prevail on the merits). 
 167. See id. at 682 (requiring “some success on the merits” in order to win a 
fee award). 
 168. See id. at 704 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the fee award’s 
purpose was to “encourage litigation which [sic] will assure proper 
implementation . . . of the act or otherwise serve the public interest”) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 (1977))). 
 169. See id. at 703. 
 170. See id. at 710. 
 171. Cf. id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that the court of 
appeals “complied with the plain language of the statute” because it 
“explained . . . why it believed an award . . . appropriate”).  
 172. See id. at 683–85 (discussing relevant background principles); Aleyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–70 (1975) (explaining 
the origins of the “American Rule” that prevailing parties cannot collect attorney 
fees from the losing party). The Aleyeska Court identified this rule with the old 
common law of England and the early practice of U.S. federal courts. See id. at 
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different conclusion based on the CAA’s text, read in the context of 
other statutes authorizing attorney fees.173 It noted that many 
statutes expressly authorize attorney fees only to “prevailing 
parties,”174 but that the CAA does not contain this limitation, 
suggesting that Congress intended no such restriction.175 The 
legislative history likewise supports the dissent’s position. That 
history, as the dissent points out, shows that the Senate 
Committee had considered limiting attorney fees to prevailing 
parties, but did not adopt a provision containing that limitation.176 
The House Report also expressly indicates that the language of the 
statute ultimately adopted was not intended to limit the court to 
awarding fees to prevailing parties.177 Thus, the Court’s decision 
depended heavily on wrenching the word “appropriate” from its 
context in the statute and putting it into the context of a common 
law rule created by the Court as a background presumption.178 
Unlike the one previous 5–4 decision, Adamo, this case did not 
come from a conflict between purpose and text, but rather from a 
conflict between common law judging and faithful contextual 
reading of the CAA.  
The Court followed up with a pair of decisions restricting the 
use of multipliers to reward public interest attorneys for superior 
representation or substantial litigation risks.179 Both of these 
                                                                                                     
247–50. The Aleyeska Court also identified this rule as statutory. See id. at 
254– 70; cf. id. at 272–75 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the common law 
generally prohibits fee-shifting but permits exceptions where the public interest 
so requires). 
 173. See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 702 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“Congress did not intend the outcome of the case to be conclusive in the decision 
whether to award fees under § 307(f)”). 
 174. See id. at 701–02. 
 175. See id. (stating that “the language of § 307(f) [of the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2012)] differs crucially from the wording of many other federal 
statutes authorizing the court to award attorney’s fees and costs”). 
 176. See id. at 703–04 (describing the Senate’s consideration of a provision 
that failed to make it into the final draft of § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act).   
 177. See id. at 704 (“The committee did not intend that the court’s discretion 
to award fees . . . should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was 
the ‘prevailing party’.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 (1977))). 
 178. See id. at 710. 
 179. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens Council (Delaware Valley II), 
483 U.S. 711, 714–15, 724 (1987) (reversing a decision adjusting an attorney fee 
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rulings develop a judicial common law on the subject of fee awards, 
and neither feature consideration of the CAA's fundamental 
purpose.180 Nor did the language authorizing fee awards provide 
meaningful guidance to the issues before the Court, as it simply 
authorized courts to “award costs of litigation (including 
reasonable attorney fees . . . ).”181 The ruling restricting fee awards 
to compensate for the risks of losing litigation did not produce a 
majority for any rationale, as the Justices’ beliefs about proper 
attorney fee policy diverged.182 
A unanimous Court gave short shrift to statutory language in 
upholding EPA’s right to use aerial surveillance to enforce the CAA 
in Dow Chemical Company v. United States.183 In that case, EPA 
relied on a statutory provision authorizing “entry to, upon, or 
through any premises” upon “presentation of credentials.”184 In 
response to Dow Chemical’s argument that this provision does not 
mention aerial surveillance and that unannounced surveillance 
conflicts with the presentation-of-credentials requirement, the 
Court made no textual argument about whether aerial 
surveillance might be an “entry to, upon, or through” the premises 
nor did it engage in any discussion of the 
presentation-of-credentials requirement.185 Instead, the Dow 
Chemical Court treated the statutory enforcement remedies as 
non-exclusive.186 In spite of rather specific statutory language, the 
                                                                                                     
upward to reflect the risk of losing and not getting paid at all); Pennsylvania v. 
Del. Valley Citizens Council (Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546, 568–69 (1986) 
(finding no reason to increase the fee award to reflect the quality of 
representation). 
 180. Cf. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 725, 735 (plurality and dissenting 
opinions) (citing CAA legislative history to support their positions).  
 181. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561–67 (1992) (Scalia, J.) 
(creating a rule against enhancement of attorney fees to reflect the risk of losing 
under the Clean Water Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act based on various 
policy rationales and the Delaware Valley II plurality opinion); Delaware Valley 
I, 478 U.S. at 557 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2012)). 
 182. Compare Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 724–31 (plurality opinion), with 
id. at 731–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 183. 476 U.S. 227, 234 (1986). 
 184. Id. at 233–34. 
 185. Id.  
 186. See id. at 234 (finding “no suggestion . . . that the powers conferred by 
§114(a) [of 42 U.S.C. § 7414] are intended to be exclusive”). 
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Dow Chemical Court followed the attorney fee cases in relying on 
a general background principle of lawin the Dow Chemical case, 
the principle that enforcement authority “carries with it all modes 
of . . . investigation . . . useful” to its execution.187 
 The Court unanimously adopted a reading of the CAA that 
furthered statutory purposes without mentioning the CAA’s 
overall purpose. The conservative justices appear to have done so 
because the case also raised a constitutional issue that they viewed 
as more significant.188 Given the opportunity to trim the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizures, 
they held that the CAA authorized the search at issue and that the 
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit it.189 The statutory holding 
was unanimous, but the constitutional holding was 5–4, with most 
of the Justices’ votes falling along conventional ideological lines.190  
The most famous CAA case of this period, Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,191 provides further evidence of the 
decline of purpose and structure as guides to the Court’s decisions. 
Most students and scholars know Chevron as a leading 
administrative law case establishing the rule that courts must 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes.192 But a careful reading of Chevron as a CAA case shows 
that Chevron also provides an example of the decline of purpose as 
a guide to statutory interpretation.  
The Chevron Court upheld an EPA decision to use a 
plant-wide definition of the term “stationary source” for purposes 
of administering a permit program for new sources.193 Under the 
plant-wide definition, a modification or installation increasing 
                                                                                                     
 187. Id. at 233.  
 188. Cf. Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2006) (noting that the canon counseling courts to 
avoid constitutional issues if fairly possible is a “prominent” rule of statutory 
construction). 
 189. See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 234–52 (describing, in the majority and 
dissenting opinions, the investigatory authority Congress vested in EPA). 
 190. See id. 
 191. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 192. See, e.g., Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 
1565– 66 (2007).  
 193. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–42 (discussing the drafter’s failure to define 
“stationary source”). 
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emissions of one piece of equipment would not trigger strict new 
source regulatory requirements, if reductions elsewhere in the 
plant offset the increase.194 This source definition facilitated a 
move toward emissions trading, a reform commended by 
economists but not in use at the time.195 
The Court correctly recognized that the CAA’s stationary 
source definition read in isolation does not answer the question of 
whether a plant-wide definition is permissible.196 It therefore 
treated the statute as ambiguous and deferred to EPA’s reasonable 
construction.197  
In Chevron, the CAA’s purpose and structure serve the role of 
the dog that did not bark.198 The Court of Appeals had construed 
the CAA as providing for a dual source definition, based not on the 
language of the stationary source definition (which it likewise 
found ambiguous), but on the statute’s goals and structure.199 
Under this dual definition, EPA should use a plant-wide source 
definition for pollution in areas that had attained the NAAQS 
(attainment areas), but not in areas that had not attained the 
NAAQS (nonattainment areas).200 It based this ruling on the 
correct idea that the CAA aimed to improve air quality in 
nonattainment areas, whilst it only sought to maintain existing air 
quality in attainment areas.201 For technical reasons described in 
                                                                                                     
 194. See id. at 840 (explaining that a plant owner “may install or modify one 
piece of equipment without meeting permit conditions if the alternation will not 
increase total emissions from the plant”).  
 195. See id. at 863 n.37 (recognizing that bubbles and offsets are a “first step” 
toward reliance on “economic incentives” proposed by economists). 
 196. See id. at 861–62 (finding the relevant language “not dispositive” because 
the relevant provision uses “overlapping language” not precisely directed to the 
question before the Court).  
 197. See id. at 865–66 (finding that Congress did not resolve the meaning of 
the statute “on the level of specificity required by these cases” and therefore 
deferring to EPA). 
 198. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 220 (discussing Sherlock Holmes’s use of 
inferences from a dog not barking in the “Silver Blaze” story). 
 199. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 842 n.7 (recognizing that the Court of 
Appeals ruling relied on the “purposes of the nonattainment program”) (quoting 
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 n.39 (1982))). 
 200. See id. at 840–41. 
 201. See id. at 841–42 (characterizing the court of appeals opinion as treating 
air quality improvement as the nonattainment program’s “raison d’être”). 
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the margin, the plant-wide definition should in principle suffice to 
maintain air quality but not to improve it.202 The failure of the 
Supreme Court to even discuss this point suggests a decline in the 
role of statutory purpose and structure in its jurisprudence.203  
The standard accounts suggest that as purpose receded in 
importance, textualism took its place. The CAA cases of the 1980s 
tell a different story. For the most part, at least in the CAA context, 
judge-made common law filled the gap created by purpose’s 
decline, not any devotion to textualism.204 But in one case on a very 
technical issue—Chevron—the Court substituted agency deference 
for a common law rule of its own devising.205  
This move toward common law decision-making led to (or 
perhaps reflects) ideological division on the Court. As Table 1 
(above) indicates, the Court’s CAA decisions were more closely 
divided during this period than they had been in the 1970s, and as 
Table 2 indicates (below), these divides usually tracked ideological 
lines.  
  
                                                                                                     
 202. Under the 1977 Amendments, the construction or modification of a piece 
of equipment under a plantwide definition would lead to maintenance but not 
improvement of air quality, because the plantwide definition would allow 
pollution increasing changes to occur if the plant owner offset those increases with 
other changes in the plant. See id. at 841. Under a narrow source definition 
treating each piece of equipment as a stationary source, emission increasing 
modifications or installations would lead to declining net emissions, because they 
would trigger requirements to control the new emissions and offset the remaining 
emissions at a greater than 1:1 ratio. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 
685 F.2d 718, 721 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (noting that under EPA’s offset ruling 
“emissions from existing sources in the [nonattainment] region must be reduced 
by an amount greater than the contemplated emissions from the proposed new or 
modified source”) (emphasis added). 
 203. The principle of deference to agencies announced in Chevron did not by 
itself preclude consideration of whether statutory purpose resolved textual 
ambiguity. See id. at 843 n.9 (noting that the Court must give effect to specific 
congressional intent found through “traditional tools of statutory construction”). 
The Chevron Court relied on a policy goal of allowing “reasonable economic 
growth” based on legislative history, but not on the CAA’s stated overall goal. See 
id. at 851–52, 863 (describing allowance of economic growth as one of the policies 
behind the new source review program).  
 204. See Driesen, supra note 86, at 111. 
 205. See, e.g., The Two Faces of Chevron, supra note 192. 
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We rely here on the Justices’ annual Martin-Quinn scores, a 
measure of judicial ideology widely used by political scientists.225 
“Ordered” indicates that the Justices’ votes fall as would be 
predicted by the ordering of these scores.226 “Disordered” indicates 
that at least one Justice voted in a way not predicted by the 
alignment of these scores; in other words, with the Justices placed 
in a straight line from left to right, at least one Justice jumped over 
one or more neighboring colleagues to join with colleagues located 
further away in ideological space.227  
D. The Rise of Textualism: 1990–2004 
A few years after Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, the 
Court, in keeping with his judicial philosophy, started to fill the 
void left by declining support for purposivism with textualism, 
rather than common law decision-making or deference to EPA.228 
Most of these cases seem congruent with statutory purpose, but 
the Court followed the text even when it served to undermine the 
CAA’s structure and purpose (as it had in Adamo).229 
General Motors Corp. v. United States,230 decided four years 
after Justice Scalia joined the Court, featured careful textual work 
                                                                                                     
 225. On the calculation of Martin-Quinn scores as ideal points for judicial 
ideologies, see Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point 
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (data through the 2015 term available for 
download at http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php). As Martin-Quinn 
scores are calculated in part by including previous voting patterns of the justices, 
these endogenous measures err on the side of ideological attribution. For an 
exogenous measure commonly used in judicial decision-making studies, see 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). On the use of “voting 
disorder” as an indicator of influences beyond the single ideological dimension 
commonly employed in studies of judicial decision-making, see Paul H. Edelman, 
David E. Klein, & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Measuring Deviations from Expected 
Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 228 (noting that Justice Scalia’s new 
textualism advocated consideration of statutory structure). 
 229. Id. 
 230. 496 U.S. 530 (1990). 
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integrating a number of statutory subsections.231 The case resolved 
a circuit split on the question of whether an EPA failure to timely 
act on a SIP revision bars EPA enforcement of the existing SIP 
requirements.232 The Court recognized that the CAA expressly 
authorizes enforcement of an “applicable implementation plan” 
and defines an applicable implementation plan as the most recent 
approved version.233 The Court also noted that the statute provides 
remedies for delays in approving a SIP revision, but that the 
remedies provided do not explicitly include an enforcement bar.234 
The Court therefore held that EPA may enforce a SIP after a state 
has submitted a revision that EPA has not completed reviewing. 
This case’s treatment of listed remedies as exclusive contrasts 
with Dow Chemical’s treatment of remedies as non-exclusive.235 
Both cases serve the Act’s purposes, but neither mentions 
purpose.236 They simply take opposite approaches to interpreting 
texts governing remedies.237 
In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,238 Justice Scalia 
followed the text to reach a result similar to that which the Court 
had reached in Union Electric more than two decades before. Just 
as the Union Electric Court had held that EPA may not consider 
cost in deciding whether to approve a SIP because the SIP approval 
provision does not mention cost, the American Trucking Court held 
that EPA may not consider cost in promulgating the NAAQS 
because the provisions governing the NAAQS do not mention it, 
instead requiring a standard to protect public health with an 
                                                                                                     
 231. Cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 228 (noting that Justice Scalia’s new 
textualism advocated consideration of statutory structure). 
 232. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 536 (1990) 
(explaining that the Court “granted certiorari because of a disagreement among 
the Circuits as to whether EPA is barred from enforcing an existing SIP if the 
agency fails to take action on a proposed SIP revision within four months”). 
 233. Id. at 540. 
 234. See id. at 540–41 n.4 (mentioning actions to compel agency action and a 
request for penalty reduction in the event of prejudice from the delay). 
 235. See id. at 539–42. 
 236. See Gen. Motors, 496 U.S. at 530; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 
U.S. 227 (1986).  
 237. See Gen. Motors, 496 U.S. at 530; Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227. 
 238. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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“adequate margin of safety.”239 The Court relied squarely on both 
Union Electric and General Motors in declining to import a new 
element into a statutory provision that does not mention the 
sought after element.240 
This case featured a prodigious effort to bring the changes in 
elite opinion to bear in litigation under the CAA. The numerous 
briefs filed by industry and its allies argue that rational policy 
requires CBA, or at least consideration of cost, in keeping with the 
teachings of law and economics.241 The Court’s rejection of this 
argument under the leadership of a Justice not suspected of any 
personal sympathy for the CAA’s philosophy arguably provides 
evidence that text can sometimes restrain judicial activism.242   
Yet, Justice Breyer’s concurrence signals his philosophical 
support for the elite views that emerged in the late 1970s and 
1980s, stating that to better “achieve regulatory goalsfor 
example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or 
produce a cleaner environmentregulators must often take into 
account all of a proposed regulation’s adverse effects.”243 This 
treatment of regulation as a form of resource allocation echoes a 
fundamental tenet of the law and economics movement. And the 
reference to considering all of regulation’s “adverse effects” 
strongly suggests support for CBA. Yet, he concludes that the 
                                                                                                     
 239. See id. at 465 (finding it fairly clear that the instruction to set NAAQS 
“to protect public health” with an “adequate margin of safety” does not permit 
consideration of cost). 
 240. See id. at 467–68 (“We have therefore refused to find implicit in 
ambiguous sections of the CAA an authorization to consider costs that has 
elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Brief for General Electric as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Cross-Petitioner, Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 
99-1426), 2000 WL 1010086, at *1 [hereinafter Amicus Brief Supporting General 
Electric] (arguing that society is best served by a “rational” system of risk 
management that considers cost and tradeoffs); cf. Brief for United States Public 
Interest Research Group Education Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Cross-Respondents, Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 
99-1426), 2000 WL 1299562, at *11 (arguing that industry seeks to incorporate 
teachings of the law and economics movement into the CAA, but that the 
Congress of 1970 was not among the movement’s pupils). 
 242. See Amicus Brief Supporting General Electric, supra note 241, at *1 
(arguing that judicial scrutiny of administrative statutes must include cost 
analysis). 
 243. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 490 (2001). 
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Congress adopting the 1970 Amendments had a philosophy and 
approach that postpones cost considerations until later in the 
process of implementing the CAA.244 And he defends the 
congressional decision to exclude cost from consideration at the 
time of NAAQS promulgation, because he recognizes that 
technology-forcing makes cost unpredictable.245 
While both General Motors and American Trucking feature an 
alignment between statutory text and purpose, the two diverged in 
Engine Manufacturers Ass’ns v. South Coast Air Quality 
Management District,246 and the Court chose text over purpose by 
an 8–1 margin.247 The Court held that the CAA preempted 
California requirements that fleet owners purchase clean vehicles 
(vehicles with very low emissions).248 This case interpreted a 
statutory subsection preempting “standard[s] relating to the 
control of emissions from new motor vehicles.”249 The Court found, 
understandably, that requirements to purchase clean vehicles 
generally constituted standards relating to the control of 
emissions.250  
Justice Souter’s dissent shows that statutory structure and 
legislative history support a narrower reading of the relevant 
subsection.251 For example, Congress mandated state clean fuel 
fleet rules, which makes the conclusion that it also preempted such 
requirements odd.252 The dissent also applies a presumption 
                                                                                                     
 244. See id. at 493 (discussing CAA authority to consider costs while 
implementing the NAAQS). 
 245. See id. at 492–93 (characterizing technology forcing as rational and 
realistic and recognizing that it makes cost estimation “less important and more 
difficult”). 
 246. 541 U.S. 246 (2004). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See id. at 255 (determining that the CAA preempts state imposed sales 
restrictions and purchase restrictions). 
 249. Id. at 252 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012)). 
 250. See id. at 253–54.  
 251. See id. at 259–65 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s “broad 
definition[s]” that “render superfluous” other parts of the provision and adopting 
a practical interpretation of “standard” more “in tune with Congress’s object in 
providing for preemption”). 
 252. See id. at 264–65 (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding the majority’s 
construction of the preemption provision “difficult to square” with Section 246, 
which mandates that states establish “precisely the kind of . . . regulations” that 
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against preemption that the Court has repeatedly stated applies to 
interpretation of preemption provisions, but rarely gives force to.253 
The case, as a whole, clearly reinforces the primacy of text over 
purpose and structure. 
When text could not resolve a case during this period, the 
Court split largely on ideological grounds. In Alaska Department 
of Environmental Conservation v. EPA (ADEC),254 the Court held, 
in a 5–4 decision, that EPA can use its authority to stop 
construction of a new facility to countermand an unreasonable 
state determination that the facility’s pollution control plan 
conforms to the CAA.255 The statutory language germane to this 
question contains enough vagaries to justify a 5–4 split on textual 
grounds alone.256 Yet, the division on the Court tracks general 
ideological divisions on constitutional federalism questions well 
enough to make it hard to believe that value-free textual readings 
determined the outcome. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority 
opinion, which Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer 
joined.257 Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Scalia and Thomas.258 The 
majority deferred to some extent to EPA and also mentioned 
structural justifications rooted in preventing a race-to-the-bottom 
in state air pollution regulation and protecting interstate air 
                                                                                                     
the majority invalidated). 
 253. See id. at 260–61 (discussing this presumption); cf. Gobeille v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins., 136 S. Ct. 936, 946 (2016) (noting the rule presuming that Congress 
does not intend to preempt state law, but declining to give this presumption 
weight). 
254.  540 U.S. 461, 463 (2004). 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. at 490 (characterizing the CAA’s text as “less than crystalline”). 
The majority relies on a provision authorizing EPA to stop construction of a 
facility when the state fails to comply with CAA requirements. Id. at 473 (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)). The Court accepts EPA’s reading of the statute as 
authority to stop construction when a state requires best available control 
technology (BACT), as the CAA requires, but makes an unreasonable 
determination about what BACT is. The dissent emphasizes that the CAA 
authorizes the State, not EPA, to “determine” what constitutes BACT. Id. at 504 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Both textual arguments are plausible. 
 257. Id. at 467. 
 258. Id. at 502. 
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quality interests.259 The dissent relies in part on another structural 
argument in the CAA, a principle of giving states the “primary 
role” in choosing the mix of controls needed to meet federal goals.260 
To buttress this argument, the dissent also cites a constitutional 
principle presuming that states act in good faith.261 The opinions 
and voting alignments here suggest that text sometimes creates 
ambiguities that get resolved on the basis of federalism 
philosophy.262 
On the whole, textualism played a large role in the Court’s 
CAA cases during this period.263 From 1990–2004, the Court’s CAA 
                                                                                                     
 259. See id. at 485–88 (declaring its “respect” for EPA’s interpretation 
grounded in Congressional concerns about a race-to-the-bottom and pollution’s 
impact on neighboring states). 
 260. See id. at 506–07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding EPA’s position 
inconsistent with the state’s primary role in controlling pollution). 
 261. See id. at 507 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding that EPA’s position does 
not “overcome the established presumption that States act in good faith” (citing 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999))). 
 262. See id. at 502 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority’s view 
not only conflicts with the “express language of the Clean Air Act,” but disregards 
the principles that “preserve the integrity of States in our federal system”).  
 263. In addition to these cases, two more CAA cases came before the Court 
that raise no statutory interpretation issues. In Department of Transportation v. 
Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004), the Court briefly addressed the CAA in an 
opinion mostly focused on whether the National Environmental Policy Act 
requires the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to evaluate 
the environmental effects of regulations encouraging Mexican trucks to cross over 
into the United States, which helped implement the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Id. at 756. Once the Court upheld the FMCSA’s determination that 
its rules would not increase emissions, it followed that the FMCSA did not violate 
the CAA. See id. at 771–73 (holding that the FMCSA did not violate CAA 
“conformity” requirements because its actions did not increase emissions). 
Although the Court quoted a relevant CAA provision, its holding rested on an 
interpretive regulation’s failure to require a conformity determination for an 
action that did not increase emissions, not upon an interpretation of the cited 
provision. See id. at 771 (noting that the regulations “would not cause new 
emissions to exceed” thresholds provided in EPA’s implementing regulations). 
Similarly, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007), 
mentions a relevant CAA provision, but the case hinges on an analysis of a district 
court ruling’s relationship to previous EPA regulations. Id. at 565. This case arose 
from an enforcement action predicated on allegations that Duke Energy had 
modified its facilities without a permit in violation of the CAA. See id. at 570–71 
(describing the modifications triggering the enforcement action). The court of 
appeals held that Duke’s actions did not constitute a modification and affirmed a 
summary judgment ruling in favor of Duke Energy. Id. at 572. The Supreme 
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decisions include two where text and purpose were aligned and the 
Court was unanimous, emphasizing the statutory text;264 one 
where they diverged, with eight Justices following text but Justice 
Souter following purpose;265 and one where the text was ambiguous 
and the Court split 5–4 on ideological grounds.266 This last case, 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA,267 
shows that texts sometimes contain ambiguities and that ideology 
can influence how judges interpret ambiguous texts.  
E. Summary of 1970–2004 
From 1970 to 2004, the Court often coalesced around textually 
grounded interpretations, even though the ideological makeup of 
the Court shifted. In the 1970s, the Court also took statutory 
purpose quite seriously.268 When the Court’s ideological makeup 
shifted in the 1980s, however, the new conservative majority 
started to undermine the statutory purpose by creating a judicial 
common law on attorney fees, which divided the Court.269 When 
the Court turned to reviewing regulatory policy as opposed to 
enforcement cases in the 1990s and early 2000s, it turned to 
textualism and often found common ground.270 The one case that 
divided the Court in that last period, ADEC, was a genuinely 
difficult case. Hence, even though the Court divided along 
                                                                                                     
Court decided the question of whether the court of appeals ruling in effect 
invalidated an EPA regulation governing the definition of modification. See id. at 
581 (finding the court of appeal’s interpretation of EPA’s rules so far-fetched that 
it amounted to an “implicit invalidation of those regulations”). Once it concluded 
that it had, the Court remanded the case with instructions to the lower court to 
consider the question of whether a statutory bar on litigating a rule’s validity 
more than 60 days after EPA’s rulemaking applied. Id. at 581.  
 264. See generally Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). 
 265. See generally Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 
246 (2004). 
 266. See generally Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 
(2004). 
267.  540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
 268. See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 269. See supra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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ideological lines from time to time, either in hard cases or in 
attorney fees cases, it often managed unanimous or nearly 
unanimous decisions.271  
IV. Climate Disruption, Elite Thinking, and the Court: Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation 
The theory of dynamic statutory interpretation suggests that 
statutory interpreters do not so much excavate the meaning of 
statutes as adapt them to new circumstances. Advocates of the 
theory may have in mind societal problems largely unanticipated 
by the drafters, such as global climate disruption.272 But the theory 
also recognizes that judges adapt statutes to new political 
attitudes and views, such as the growing support for law and 
economics among intellectual elites and politicians.273 Our analysis 
of cases from 2005 through 2016 analyzes the type of dynamic 
statutory interpretation that has occurred during a period when 
EPA and the Supreme Court grappled with the climate disruption 
issue.   
In addition to the question of what sort of dynamic statutory 
interpretation the Supreme Court engages in when adjudicating 
CAA cases, this Part addresses the question of what sort of 
dynamic statutory interpretation EPA uses in the CAA context.274 
This question matters because even if one accepts the idea that 
dynamic statutory interpretation is either inevitable or desirable 
(or both), a question arises as to who should adapt the statute to 
new circumstances.275 Chevron, of course, suggests that where the 
                                                                                                     
 271. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (rendering unanimous 
decision); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(same); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (same); Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (same); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (same). 
 272. See supra Part II.C. 
 273. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 81 (noting that “ideologies” and “political 
environments” shape statutory interpretation). 
 274. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (stating that agencies interpreting ambiguous statutes adopt policy 
rather than interpret statutes). 
 275. See id. at 2712–14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the 
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statute is ambiguous the answer should be from the administrative 
agency implementing the statute—EPA in the CAA context.276 In 
any case, the question of who gets to adapt the statute figures in 
many of these cases, so explaining EPA’s interpretations in 
dynamic terms will enrich the discussion and pave the way for the 
normative analysis in Part IV. 
A. The Supreme Court and Climate Disruption 
During the George W. Bush Administration, petitions 
requesting EPA to list greenhouse gases as pollutants forced the 
Agency to consider whether to regulate greenhouse gases and how 
to adapt the CAA to the new problem of climate disruption.277  Such 
a listing would trigger an obligation to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions.278 Although climate disruption had not emerged as a 
major issue when Congress enacted the CAA, the language 
governing the listing of air pollutants is so broad that it reaches all 
substances emitted into the ambient air.279 Of course, the 
Executive Branch’s views not only about what the CAA says, but 
also about what sound policy requires may influence its decisions 
about how to adapt the statute to address the climate disruption 
problem.  
EPA denied the petitions on the grounds that granting them 
would create a piecemeal approach to greenhouse gas 
abatement.280 The denial facilitated the Bush Administration’s 
effort to address the problem by supporting technological 
innovation, encouragement of voluntary reductions, and further 
research.281 Furthermore, granting the petitions would, according 
                                                                                                     
constitutionality of deferring to administrative agencies under Chevron). 
 276. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 277. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–11 (2007) (discussing 
environmental organizations’ petition in 1999 and EPA’s denial of the petition in 
2003). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2012) (enumerating an extensive list of 
hazardous air pollutants). 
 280. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513 (citing Control of Emissions from 
New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003)). 
 281. See id. (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and 
1828 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781 (2018) 
to EPA at the time, weaken diplomatic efforts to persuade 
developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.282 Thus, 
by denying the petitions, the Bush EPA, in its view, properly 
adapted the statute to facilitate the wisest approach to the issue.283 
Thus, a political view about how to address global climate 
disruption influenced the initial decision-maker’s view about how 
to adapt the CAA to a new problem. 
Accordingly, EPA interpreted the key term governing the 
listing decision—air pollutant—as not including greenhouse 
gases.284 It construed the statute as focusing on local, not global, 
air pollution problems.285 It bolstered this conclusion by noting 
that Congress had considered the problem of global climate 
disruption but did not specifically mandate regulations to address 
it.286 
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA reversed EPA’s 
decision in a 5–4 ruling holding that greenhouse gases constituted 
air pollutants under the CAA.287 The majority had “little trouble” 
in reaching this conclusion because the CAA sweepingly defines an 
air pollutant as “any air pollution agent or combination of agents, 
including any . . . substance or matter which . . . enters the ambient 
air.”288 The Court found that the statute unambiguously regulates 
“all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.”289 From the 
standpoint of textualism, this was an easy case. From the 
standpoint of adaptive statutory construction, it might instead 
depend on judicial views about what statutory approach best 
adapts the statute to efforts to address global climate disruption.290  
                                                                                                     
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,932–33). 
 282. See id. (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and 
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931). 
 283. See id. at 533.  
 284. See id. at 513. 
 285. See id. at 512–13. 
 286. See id. at 511–12 (discussing EPA’s view of the issue’s “political history”). 
 287. See id. at 528 (holding that the CAA authorizes regulation of greenhouse 
gases if they contribute to climate change). 
 288. See id. at 528–29 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)). 
 289. Id. at 529. 
 290. See infra notes 310–311 and accompanying text. 
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A dissent by the Court’s leading textualist, Justice Scalia, 
offered an extraordinarily contrived reading of CAA § 209 in an 
effort to escape the majority’s conclusion.291 The Scalia dissent 
then accuses the majority of substituting “its own desired outcome” 
for EPA’s “reasoned judgment.”292 Thus, the dissenting Justices 
viewed themselves as deferring to an agency judgment under an 
ambiguous statute per Chevron, while viewing the majority as 
engaging in inappropriate dynamic statutory interpretation.293 
The dissent’s reading certainly suggests that text does not 
always constrain even seemingly devout textualist judges, at least 
in a highly charged case. Massachusetts v. EPA resolved an 
immensely important and controversial environmental and 
political issue—whether the CAA authorizes the Executive Branch 
to address global climate disruption without fresh legislation from 
Congress.294 By contrast, we saw in American Trucking that text 
did control when the Court faced a less controversial and older 
                                                                                                     
 291. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 556–58 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). The statutory language defines an air pollutant as “any air pollution 
agent . . . including any . . . substance . . . which is emitted into . . . the ambient 
air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012). Although Scalia concedes that this can be read as 
indicating that the category of air pollution agents includes all substances emitted 
into the air, he resists this conclusion. Id. at 556–57. Scalia argues that the term 
“any air pollutant agent” may qualify the meaning of substances emitted into the 
air. Id. at 557–58. Since the statute does not define the term “air pollution agent,” 
Scalia would hold that EPA’s interpretation of that term as only embracing 
pollutants that occur primarily near the surface of the earth is reasonable, 
thereby reading it as not embracing greenhouse gases, which primarily occupy 
the upper atmosphere. Id. at 558–59. This conclusion is unconvincing, since the 
CAA states that the term “air pollution agent” includes “any . . . substance which 
is emitted into . . . the ambient air,” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (emphasis added), 
suggesting no limits based on where the pollutant goes after being released into 
the air around us. Scalia resists this conclusion by arguing that sometimes 
illustrative terms included within a “general term” (“pollution agent” in this case) 
are limited by the scope of the general term. See id. at 556–58 (relying on the 
government’s argument that the phrase “any American automobile, including any 
truck or minivan” would not include foreign trucks or minivans). While this is 
true, it seems extraordinarily contrived as applied to the term “pollution agent,” 
which lacks any adjective indicating limits to the term. See id. at 529 n.26 
(majority opinion) (pointing out that the statute seems consciously crafted to 
embody a “broad” definition of pollution not limited by atmospheric layers). 
 292. Id. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 293. See id. at 552–53. 
 294. See id. at 528.  
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issue.295 Moreover, the lineup of the Justices on the climate 
disruption issue suggests that when forced to decide what a statute 
says about a controversial new problem, judges may divide along 
ideological lines regardless of a statute’s text.296 The Court’s liberal 
JusticesStevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer (along with 
Kennedy)in effect voted to adapt the CAA to the climate 
disruption problem by triggering EPA regulation.297 The Court’s 
conservative JusticesRoberts, Thomas, Alito, and Scaliain 
effect voted to adapt the CAA to climate disruption by leaving it to 
Executive Branch diplomacy and voluntary initiatives.298 The 
dissent, although cast in terms of deference to EPA in the face of 
ambiguity, does not so much excavate past congressional intent as 
give the statute the meaning that the Bush EPA thinks it should 
have with respect to the new problem of global emissions causing 
worldwide environmental disruption.299 
This lineup suggests something quite troubling about dynamic 
statutory interpretation. At least for a controversial new problem, 
it may lead to judges choosing the appropriate form of adaptation 
in accordance with their own political views.300 While this is 
perhaps inevitable when the statute is ambiguous with respect to 
a new issue, one would like to think that this can be avoided when 
the text is as clear as that involved in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA found that 
greenhouse gases endangered public health and the environment 
and listed the principal greenhouse gases as regulated pollutants 
under the CAA.301 The CAA contains a host of provisions requiring 
regulation of “any air pollutant;” accordingly, this “endangerment 
                                                                                                     
 295. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001). 
 296. See KECK, infra note 300. 
 297. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531. 
 298. See id. at 552. 
 299. See id. at 560. 
 300. Cf. THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 140 (2014) 
(suggesting that judges’ votes diverge more sharply along partisan lines when a 
hot button issue comes before them). 
 301. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310–11 (2014) (citing 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,523 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I)). 
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finding” apparently triggered a host of regulatory obligations.302 
Shortly after President Obama came into office, EPA promulgated, 
jointly with other agencies, a regulation drastically reducing 
tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases from automobiles and other 
regulatory actions soon followed.303  
One of EPA’s subsequent regulatory actions provides a clearer 
example of a new problem requiring a dynamic interpretation 
updating a statute—the question of how broadly EPA should 
regulate greenhouse gases. The literal language of the CAA 
requires applying the CAA’s Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) and operating permit programs to all major 
sources of air pollution—defined as sources emitting 100 or 250 
tons per year.304 Because pollution sources typically emit 
greenhouse gases in volumes far exceeding the volumes of 
emissions of previously regulated air pollutants, these numerical 
thresholds, if applied literally to greenhouse gas emitters, would 
sweep in so many smaller sources—such as large office and 
apartment buildings, hotels, and retail establishments—that it 
would make it impossible to administer the program.305 EPA 
accordingly adapted the statute to this new problem of regulating 
high volume greenhouse gases in a “Tailoring Rule” by promising 
to focus initially on large sources while postponing action on 
                                                                                                     
 302. See id. at 311–12 (discussing some of EPA’s views of what stationary 
source requirements the finding would trigger (citing Reconsideration of 
Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air 
Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, and 71))). 
 303. See id. (discussing EPA’s automobile regulations and other regulatory 
actions). 
 304. See id. at 310 (discussing these thresholds (citing Regulating Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,420, 44,498, 44,511 (July 
30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I))). 
 305. See id. at 334–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(explaining the significance of these thresholds as applied to greenhouse gas 
emissions); see also Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 
144 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA., 573 U.S. 302 (2014), and amended sub nom. Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 606 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that applying the 
thresholds literally to greenhouse gas-emitting sources would raise permit 
applications “to jump from 280 per year to over 81,000 per year”). 
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smaller ones.306 This problem seems to demand dynamic statutory 
interpretation, because nobody believes that Congress sought the 
results that a literal application of the statute would produce.307 
Thus, the situation seemed to require a decision about how to 
sensibly adapt the statute to the problem of regulating greenhouse 
gases in the absence of reliable guidance about what Congress 
intended. 
The D.C. Circuit managed to avoid resolving the tension 
between sensible statutory adaptation and the CAA’s literal 
language. Regulated industries and some states, which usually 
like exemptions from statutes, challenged the rule, whilst 
environmental groups which usually prefer broad coverage, did not 
challenge the Tailoring Rule.308 Since the Tailoring Rule offers 
regulatory relief to the petitioning states and industries, the D.C. 
Circuit held that those parties lacked standing to challenge the 
Tailoring Rule for want of injury-in-fact.309 Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
left the task of dynamic interpretation to EPA.  
For better or worse, however, the Supreme Court grasped the 
nettle in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG).310 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the UARG majority, engineered an escape from 
the statute’s literal language with respect to coverage of pollutants 
in order to adapt the statute to this new problem in a manner the 
Supreme Court found more sensible than EPA’s approach.311 
                                                                                                     
 306. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 312–13 (explaining that EPA 
proposed to apply the program to large sources first and held out the possibility 
of later exempting smaller ones).  
 307. See id. at 319–20 (explaining that Congress’s “profligate use” of the term 
“air pollutant” was meant to be narrower than the Act-wide definition). 
 308. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 113 (noting that 
industry and state petitioners did not challenge the Tailoring Rule). 
 309. Id. at 146. The Court also held that providing the relief sought, vacating 
the Tailoring Rule, would exacerbate, rather than redress, the petitioners’ 
injuries. Id. 
 310. 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
 311. See William W. Buzbee, Anti-Regulatory Skewing and Political Choice in 
UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 73 (2015) (characterizing the Court’s 
rewriting of the CAA as the “antithesis” of objective textualism); see also Richard 
J. Lazarus, The Opinion Assignment Power, Justice Scalia’s Un-Becoming, and 
UARG’s Unanticipated Cloud over the Clean Air Act, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 
44–45 (2015) (characterizing the opinion as “un-Scalia-like” as it offered a 
compromise in lieu of adherence to text). 
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Although the CAA applied PSD and Title V to emitters of “any air 
pollutant” and the Court had held in Massachusetts v. EPA that 
greenhouse gases are air pollutants, the Court held that the 
statute should be interpreted to prohibit the application of PSD or 
Title V to greenhouse gases except in one instance.312 The statute, 
in the majority’s view, applied to the PSD program only insofar as 
it requires Best Available Control Technology (BACT) of sources 
already regulated because of exceeding the thresholds for other 
pollutants.313 The majority reasoned that the phrase “any air 
pollutant” (the trigger for PSD and Title V) must be construed 
more narrowly than the phrase “each pollutant regulated under 
this chapter” (which governs BACT), even though the phrase “any 
air pollutant” seems broader than the phrase “each pollutant 
subject to regulation under this chapter.”314 
Dissenting from the holding that EPA may not regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions under Title V or the general PSD 
provision, Justice Breyer employed a different dynamic 
interpretation to save the statute from obsolescence.315 Instead of 
interpreting the phrase “any air pollutant” narrowly, Breyer 
suggested interpreting the phrase “any stationary source” 
narrowly to avoid regulating sources that cannot practically be 
regulated.316 Justice Breyer therefore would defer to EPA’s 
apparent judgment that the CAA should apply to fewer sources 
than it literally says, not to fewer pollutants than it literally 
says.317  
Justice Breyer defended this result as serving the CAA’s 
purpose of enhancing and protecting air quality.318 He noted that 
legislative history supported the notion that Congress did not 
intend such expansive coverage of stationary sources, 
                                                                                                     
 312. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 315–28 (seeking to justify this 
extraordinary interpretation). 
 313. See id. at 331. 
 314. Id. (emphasis added). 
 315. See id. at 341 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(recognizing that the statute should be construed to avoid obsolescence). 
 316. See id. at 334–40 (explaining this interpretation). 
 317. See id. at 340 (invoking Chevron deference). 
 318. See id. at 341 (arguing that “an implicit source-related exception” serves 
the CAA’s statutory purpose while going no further). 
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notwithstanding the numbers in the statute.319  On the other hand, 
he suggested that the CAA’s broad definition of air pollution was 
intended to allow expansion to effectively address new problems.320 
Thus, he argued for using statutory purpose as a major guide to 
figuring out how to adapt a statute to new problems.  
While Justice Breyer would have resolved the UARG 
majority’s “selective” literalism with respect to pollution triggers 
by reading the pollution triggers literally and allowing exemption 
of some sources, Justices Alito and Thomas would ignore the literal 
language of the pollution triggers altogether and prohibit any 
regulation of greenhouse gases under the PSD or Title V 
programs.321 Justices Alito and Thomas bolster their views with a 
dynamic statutory argument of their own—since various aspects 
of the BACT program fit greenhouse gases poorly, it should not 
apply to greenhouse gases.322 Thus, they neither followed the 
literal language nor provided any other reason to think that their 
solution comes from a congressional policy decision embodied in 
the CAA.323 Instead, they explain why they think that their 
solution to the new problem makes sense.  
A third case, American Electric Power, Co. v. Connecticut 
(AEP),324 did not so much adapt the statute to the climate 
disruption problem as apply prior precedent.325 In AEP, the Court 
unanimously held that the CAA displaced federal common law 
claims against power plants seeking abatement of carbon dioxide 
emissions.326 In reaching this conclusion, which creates 
                                                                                                     
 319. See id. at 340 (citing legislative history indicating an intent not to 
regulate the types of sources EPA sought to exclude through the Tailoring Rule). 
 320. See id. at 341 (finding the majority’s holding inconsistent with 
Congressional intent to adapt the statute to new air pollution problems uncovered 
by science). 
 321. See id. at 343–45 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(agreeing with the Court’s holding that PSD and Title V do not apply to 
greenhouse gases, but disagreeing that BACT requirements do and 
characterizing the majority’s literalism as “selective”). 
 322. See id. at 345–49 (finding BACT analysis “fundamentally incompatible” 
with the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions). 
 323. See id. at 349. 
 324. 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
 325. See infra notes 327–328 and accompanying text. 
 326. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011). 
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considerable tension with the CAA’s text and purpose, the Court 
followed a 5–4 decision from the 1980s—Milwaukee v. Illinois 
(Milwaukee II)327—which narrowly interpreted identical text in the 
Clean Water Act to advance a judicial policy disfavoring federal 
common law.328 In this way, AEP constitutes an extension of the 
1980s common law judicial decision-making, albeit based on 
quasi-constitutional grounds. 
Thus, in adapting the CAA to the new problem of climate 
disruption, the conservative textualist Justices and sometimes the 
whole Court abandoned text. Their rulings divided mostly along 
ideological lines, except where a clear (albeit countertextual) 
precedent based on previous quasi-constitutional judicial 
policymaking brought them together.329  
B. Adaptation to Elite Views 
During the same years that EPA began grappling with climate 
disruption, it dynamically interpreted the CAA’s “Good Neighbor 
Provision”330 to adapt it to elite views, even though EPA confronted 
no new pollution problem in applying this provision. The Good 
Neighbor Provision deals with a longstanding problem of pollution 
emanating from one state interfering with neighboring states’ 
efforts to provide clean air.331 It requires state SIPs to prohibit 
pollution sources from emitting air pollution “in amounts which 
                                                                                                     
 327. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
 328. See id. at 317–19; Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 
(citing Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981)); cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2012) (preserving the right to seek statutory or common law 
enforcement of emission standards or limitations). 
 329. In UARG, Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas 
constituted a conservative majority holding that the PSD and Title V programs 
generally do not apply to greenhouse gas emissions. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 
573 U.S. 302, 303 (2014). The Court, however, was much less sharply divided on 
the question of whether EPA could regulate “anyway sources” under BACT. See 
id. at 330–33, 338 (majority and dissenting opinions) (showing that the Justices 
supported this holding 7–2, with only Alito and Thomas in dissent). 
 330. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2012). 
 331. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating 
the provision’s goal of prohibiting sources “within the [s]tate” from interfering 
with “any other [s]tate”). 
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will . . . contribute significantly” to nonattainment of the NAAQS 
in neighboring states.332 This provision strongly suggests that EPA 
should require abatement from pollution sources sufficient to avoid 
significantly interfering with NAAQS achievement, a task 
requiring air quality modeling to make sure that the amount of 
reductions suffice to attain this goal.333 This focus on 
environmental effects might imply no consideration of cost or 
technology in setting targets, a conclusion in keeping with Union 
Electric’s understanding that the CAA subordinates cost 
considerations to the goal of achieving the NAAQS.334 
Such a view of the statute, while textually supported, does not 
comport with elite intellectual trends. Accordingly, EPA 
considered the marginal cost effectiveness of pollution reductions 
and based its plan for abating these emissions on conclusions about 
sensible cost per ton of pollution reduction numbers.335 
Furthermore, it used a mechanism favored by law and 
economics— emissions trading—to realize these reductions.336 But 
emissions trading works for pollutants where location does not 
matter, and location does matter to the question of whether a set 
of reductions will avoid interfering with neighboring states’ 
attainment efforts.337  
When the issue of whether EPA acted properly in considering 
cost in setting the targets reached the Supreme Court in EPA v. 
                                                                                                     
 332. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
 333. See North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 908 (stating that EPA’s program to 
implement the Good Neighbor Provision must eliminate emissions contributing 
significantly to nonattainment). 
 334. See supra notes 106–107. 
 335. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 500 (2014); 
see also EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(citing Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (discussing the D.C. 
Circuit’s contradictory and confused rulings on the cost issue); North Carolina v. 
EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 572 U.S. 489 (2014). 
 336. See Homer City, 572 U.S. at 544 n.10 (citing Interstate Transport of Fine 
Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 
48271–72 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97)).   
 337. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906–08 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(invalidating EPA’s trading program under the Clean Air Interstate Rule on the 
ground that it does not ensure that each source avoids interfering with 
neighboring states’ attainment). 
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EME Homer City Generation (Homer City)338 the Court affirmed 
EPA’s Clean Air Transport Rule in a 6–2 decision.339 The Homer 
City majority clearly treated EPA’s core methodology of 
considering costs in establishing state abatement obligations as an 
appropriate adaptation of the statute to the problems of addressing 
interstate air pollution.340 It also approved of employing cost in 
part based on contemporary elite thinking, finding its use in 
allocating emission reduction obligations among the states 
“efficient.”341 The majority also linked this adaptation to technical 
necessity, as it found the alternative suggested by the D.C. Circuit, 
reducing emissions in proportion to each source’s contribution to 
each state’s attainment problem, unworkable.342 Justice Scalia’s 
dissent, however, provides a textually strong argument that the 
statute requires an allocation based on air quality alone, not 
cost.343 And the dissent did not agree that workability 
considerations required upholding EPA’s decision about the proper 
methodology for allocating reduction obligations to states.344 
On a second issue—whether EPA could promulgate a federal 
plan implementing its allocations—the dissent and majority 
flipped their approaches to statutory interpretation. The majority 
closely followed text that clearly showed that EPA may promulgate 
a federal implementation plan after disapproving state plans that 
fail to satisfy the Good Neighbor obligation.345 The dissent, 
however, adapted the statute creatively to solve a perceived 
                                                                                                     
 338. 572 U.S. 489 (2014).   
 339. See id. at 524. 
 340. See id. (finding that the D.C. Circuit requirement to allocate emission 
reductions in proportion to each state’s contribution to neighboring states’ air 
quality problems unworkable). 
 341. See id. at 519–20. 
 342. See id. at 515–16 (finding that the “proportionality approach could 
scarcely be satisfied in practice”). 
 343. See id. at 527–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the statutory 
reference to significant contribution to air pollution has no logical relationship to 
cost). 
 344. See id. at 530–35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority 
arguments that proportional reductions are impossible and result in extensive 
overcontrol). 
 345. See id. at 507–08 (noting that the statute authorizes a FIP anytime 
within two years of EPA disapproval of a SIP). 
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problem. Justice Scalia, the apostle of textualism, abandoned text 
on the ground that states cannot be expected to comply with the 
Good Neighbor Provision without effective EPA guidance and 
therefore needed another opportunity to do so now that EPA had 
issued guidance.346 The Scalia dissent buttresses this argument 
with a claim that the CAA’s cooperative federalism structure 
requires giving states a second chance now that EPA has provided 
specific targets.347  
Thus, the Court ratified EPA’s textually problematic 
adaptation of goal-setting to elite views, but simply followed text 
to ratify its implementation procedures. The dissent favored 
honoring textual constraints on EPA’s goal-setting while creatively 
adapting the statute to reign in EPA’s textually based approach to 
cooperative federalism. 
                                                                                                     
 346. See id. at 538–39 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of forcing 
states to guess at what their responsibilities might be with respect to the Good 
Neighbor Provision). The relevant text requires SIPs to include 
“provisions . . . prohibiting . . . any source . . . within the State from emitting any 
air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment 
in . . . any other State” within three years of EPA’s promulgation of a NAAQS. 42 
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2012); id. § 7410(2)(D)(i). If a state fails to submit an 
adequate SIP, the relevant text demands that EPA “promulgate a [f]ederal 
implementation plan at any time within [two] years after” disapproving a SIP. Id. 
§ 7410(c)(1). Because EPA had disapproved the relevant SIPs for noncompliance 
with the Good Neighbor Provision, it had clear statutory authority to issue a 
federal implementation plan (FIP). EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 
572 U.S. 489, 538–39 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the 
statutory principle that states have “the primary responsibility” for air pollution 
control requires that EPA issue guidance before disapproving a SIP or 
promulgating a FIP but admits that the statute does not require any EPA 
guidance at all. See id. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia argues that EPA has 
discretion to postpone the SIP submission deadline until after it issues guidance 
on how to comply with the Good Neighbor Provision, but points to no statutory 
language authorizing such a postponement. See id. at 542 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
He also argues that EPA need not promulgate a FIP before two years elapse, and 
that doing so is an abuse of discretion in this case. See id. at 542–43 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). In short, Scalia’s argument was based on his policy preference for 
guidance and runs counter to very clear text respecting SIP content and the 
deadline for SIP submission. 
 347. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. 489, 537 (2014) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority’s reading abandons cooperative 
federalism in favor of “centralized federal control”). 
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A clearer example of judicial adaptation of a statute to elite 
views comes from Michigan v. EPA,348 which reverses an EPA 
decision finding regulation of hazardous air pollutants from power 
plants “appropriate and necessary.”349 EPA found such regulation 
appropriate and necessary because of evidence that the emissions 
remaining after application of the acid rain program pose a 
significant hazard to public health.350 In making this 
determination, EPA did not consider cost, deferring such 
consideration to the first round of regulation, when it considered 
cost in promulgating technology-based standards to regulate 
hazardous air pollutants from power plants.351 
The statutory phrase “appropriate and necessary” on its face 
seems extraordinarily open-ended.352 One might take the view that 
environmental regulation is appropriate and necessary when a 
pollution problem seriously impacts public health or the 
environment.353 Or one might take the view that one should also 
consider the costs of regulation in deciding about the 
appropriateness of regulation, a view more in keeping with elite 
thinking about the importance of CBA. On its face, this sort of 
open-ended language offers a compelling context for the 
application of deference to EPA’s decision, as it seems to require a 
political decision of the sort not appropriate to the judiciary.354 
                                                                                                     
 348. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 349. See id. at 2711–12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(1) (2012)). 
 350. See id. at 2705 (explaining that EPA decided to regulate coal and oil-fired 
power plants because the plants’ emissions “posed risks to human health and the 
environment” and “controls were available to reduce these emissions”). 
 351. See id. at 2705–06 (explaining that EPA “concluded that ‘costs should not 
be considered’” when deciding whether to regulate power plants but describing 
the cost-benefit analysis EPA developed in conjunction with the actual regulation 
(quoting National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From 
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of 
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, 77 Fed. Reg. 9326 (Feb. 16, 
2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63))). 
 352. See id. at 2707 (characterizing the phrase “appropriate and necessary” 
as capacious (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012))). 
 353. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 
615 (1980) (plurality opinion) (interpreting a directive to regulate when 
“reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment” to require a finding of significant risk). 
 354. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2718 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
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The Court, however, in a 5–4 opinion split along the Court’s 
liberal–conservative fault line, based its decision on the majority’s 
preference for elite views and refused to defer to EPA’s preferred 
reading of a statutory provision that seems devoid of specific 
content, finding EPA’s cost-blind interpretation unreasonable 
under Chevron.355 The Court notes early in its opinion that EPA 
“refused to consider whether the costs of its decision outweighed 
the benefits.”356 In keeping with the “comprehensive rationality” 
traditionally associated with CBA, the Court read the term 
“appropriate” as an “all-encompassing term.”357 The 
appropriateness inquiry requires consideration of cost, because it 
would not be appropriate to impose “billions of dollars” of cost “for 
a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.”358 Thus, the 
Court assumes that environmental and health benefits can be 
reasonably described in dollar terms and adopts the views of Cass 
Sunstein, who has frequently argued that a major benefit of CBA 
involves avoidance of costs grossly disproportionate to benefits.359 
Echoing Justice Breyer’s academic contributions to the literature 
advocating a “cost-benefit state,” the Court notes that spending too 
much on one problem may leave fewer resources to devote to more 
serious problems, a frequently asserted (and cogently contested) 
assumption of those viewing regulation as just another form of 
resource allocation.360 Although the Court stopped short of 
                                                                                                     
deference should have applied here); see generally KECK, supra note 3, at 186 
(noting that “if judicial restraint means anything . . . it must mean that the 
unelected judiciary” should play a “smaller role in settling divisive conflicts”). 
 355. See id. at 2711 (finding it unworkable to read the statute “to mean that 
cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants”).  
 356. Id. at 2706. 
 357. Id. at 2707; cf. MCGARITY, supra note 54, at 5, 10–11 (explaining the 
concept of comprehensive rationality and its relationship to CBA).  
 358. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
 359. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 758 (1999) (arguing for a judicial presumption 
that regulation is unreasonable if it generates costs “grossly disproportionate to 
benefits”). 
 360. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–08 (“Consideration of cost . . . reflects 
the reality that ‘too much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well 
mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other 
(perhaps more serious) problems.’” (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 
556 U.S. 208, 233 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); 
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mandating consideration of formal CBA, it justified its decision to 
require consideration of cost in evaluating a statutory trigger with 
many of the same arguments that lie behind the law and economics 
movement’s support for CBA, including the views of elite 
moderates, such as Breyer and Sunstein.361 
The dissenting Justices (including Justice Breyer) would defer 
to EPA’s decision, largely because EPA considered cost and indeed 
conducted a CBA when it developed the regulation that the 
appropriate and necessary finding led to.362 The dissenters, 
however, echoed the elite views found in the majority opinion as to 
general regulatory philosophy and suggested that those views 
would have proven dispositive if EPA had not conformed its 
subsequent actions to those views. It opined, contrary to the 
general philosophy of the CAA, that power plant regulation would 
be “unreasonable” if EPA did not consider cost at all in regulating 
power plants.363 Echoing the majority’s articulation of elite 
orthodoxy, the dissent supported a presumption favoring the new 
elite consensus—requiring EPA to consider costs “[u]nless 
Congress provides otherwise.”364 Thus, the dissent articulates a 
position strikingly at odds with the Court’s cases following the 
CAA’s original philosophy, as both Union Electric and American 
Trucking hold that Congress does not intend to require cost 
consideration unless it specifically mentions cost.365 The dissent 
also echoes the majority’s articulation of concerns about costs 
                                                                                                     
cf. David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the 
Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10015–16 (2001) (noting that 
Breyer and other regulatory reformers do not explain how relaxing “even 
ridiculously stringent government regulation would increase the funding of 
childhood vaccination programs, or . . . other . . . preferred public health 
programs”); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 34 
(1998) (explaining that no vehicle exists for channeling cost savings from relaxed 
regulation to “deserving social programs”).   
 361. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (declining to mandate formal CBA).  
 362. See id. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (finding EPA’s action in not 
considering cost at the first stage reasonable because it considered cost 
subsequently, including a CBA). 
 363. See id. at 2717. 
 364. Id.  
 365. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001); Union Elec. 
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 271 n.5 (1976). 
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grossly disproportionate to benefits and mandates to clean up one 
form of pollution wasting resources that might be better spent on 
more important problems.366 
The elite view disfavoring the CAA’s philosophy of fully 
protecting public health regardless of apparent cost or feasibility 
so thoroughly pervades the thinking of the Supreme Court, and 
perhaps even EPA in this case, that none of the Justices even 
considered the incongruity of declining to regulate based on cost 
when the very program before the Court ultimately aimed to 
provide a basic level of safety regardless of cost.367 Although the 
Court extensively discussed the relationship between the 
“appropriate and necessary” trigger and the immediately 
subsequent cost-sensitive, technology-based rulemaking, it did not 
discuss the CAA’s requirement to eliminate residual risk through 
a standard protecting public health with an ample margin of safety 
if the technology-based standard proves insufficiently 
protective.368 The Court therefore failed to note that relying on cost 
considerations in declining to regulate hazardous air pollutants 
found to harm public health and the environment contradicts the 
CAA’s overall philosophy, which is plainly reflected in the program 
before it.369  
Thus, recent CAA cases evince a marked turn away from 
literal statutory interpretation and toward dynamic adaptation of 
the CAA, either adapting it to elite views or to the problem of 
                                                                                                     
 366. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concern about imposing “massive costs far in excess” of benefits and “wasteful 
expenditure[s]” meaning “considerably fewer resources available to deal” with 
more serious problems). 
 367. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 
(responding to an EPA argument that it need not consider cost in making an  
appropriate and necessary finding because it “can consider cost when deciding 
how much to regulate,” thereby suggesting that EPA did not make an argument 
based on the incompatibility of cost consideration and Section 112’s health 
protection goal). 
 368. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (discussing EPA’s technology-based 
rulemaking under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)). 
 369. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (stating that the purpose of the studies 
under this section of the statute is to find “hazards to public health reasonably 
anticipated to occur”); see also 116 CONG. REC. 19,204 (1970) (discussing and 
debating the importance of developing strategies and technology to achieve clean 
air because of pollution’s threat to people’s health and wellbeing).  
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climate disruption. The Court during this period did not consider 
statutory purpose, even in cases replete with statutory 
ambiguity.370 In its place, we find the Court advancing the 
regulatory philosophy of the majority of Justices. And as Tables 1 
and 2 indicate, in every case except Homer City (a 6–2 ruling) and 
AEP (a unanimous decision), the Roberts Court divided 5–4 along 
ideological lines on the question of whether to uphold EPA’s 
decisions.371 
C. Summary Description of the Evolution of the Supreme Court’s 
Approach to Interpreting the Clean Air Act 
Thus, the Court’s approach to interpreting the CAA has 
evolved over time. The first decade’s jurisprudence usually focused 
on text and purpose, but the Court misinterpreted the CAA, in the 
eyes of Congress, when it invoked quasi-constitutional clear 
statement rules to resolve cases or chose a fairly natural textual 
reading completely at odds with the statutory purpose.372 The 
Rehnquist Court abandoned purpose in the 1980s and began 
treating statutory interpretation under the CAA as an occasion to 
elaborate judge-made common law.373 But this emphasis on 
judge-made law took place in the context of issues regarding 
attorney fees, which judges may feel competent to resolve 
according to their own policy views.374 When abandoning purpose 
in the context of a more technical regulatory issue, the Court 
deferred to EPA in Chevron.375 Beginning in the 1990s, the Court 
mostly based its decisions on statutory text and turned to purpose 
                                                                                                     
 370. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2709 (2015). 
 371. Supra Tables 1 and 2.  
 372. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 258 (using both the “language and 
the legislative history” in stating that the statute “leaves no room for claims of 
technological or economic infeasibility”). 
 373. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 
562–68 (1986) (citing to other cases to derive a common-law interpretation of 
reasonable attorney’s fees).   
 374. See, e.g., id. at 548. 
 375. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984). 
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only in one especially difficult statutory case (ADEC).376 
Throughout this latter period (1990–2004), the Court almost 
always decided cases unanimously or with a large majority, and 
the one split decision (again ADEC) involved a genuinely difficult 
issue.377 
The last decade, however, has featured a turn toward dynamic 
statutory interpretation. Some dynamic statutory interpretation 
cases adapted the CAA to the climate disruption problem, but 
others adapted the CAA to trends in elite thinking.378  
This turn toward dynamic interpretation coincided with a 
trend toward ideological decision-making. As Table 2 indicates, 
four of the five decisions issued in the last decade were divided on 
ideological lines.379 Moreover, the Justices’ tendency to adapt the 
statute to their own preferences through split decisions dominates 
cases where the text is clear (e.g. Massachusetts v. EPA, where the 
majority followed it, and UARG, where nobody followed it) and 
where the text says very little (e.g. Michigan v. EPA).380  
The recent division and emphasis on judicial policymaking 
reminds one of the Rehnquist Court’s common law experiment.381 
But the modern cases differ from the 1980s common law cases in 
at least one respect; the Rehnquist Court made policy decisions in 
an area where one might expect judicial competence, namely the 
attorney fee policies for federal litigation.382 The more recent cases 
feature judicial decisions about core regulatory questions, where 
                                                                                                     
 376. See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470 (2004) 
(noting that the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions is to protect public 
health and welfare). 
 377. Supra Table 1. 
 378. See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (interpreting “appropriate and 
necessary” to require some consideration of costs); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (discussing global warming in relation to the regulation of 
greenhouse gasses). 
 379. Supra Table 2. 
 380. See generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007).  
 381. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.  
 382. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.  
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one can expect relatively little judicial expertise and substantial 
congressional and EPA engagement.383  
General common law principles do play some role in the recent 
dynamic cases, but these general principles do not constitute 
traditional background principles of substantive law, but rather 
recently minted interpretive canons, as Lisa Heinzerling has 
shown.384 In UARG, the Court applied a presumption against 
“unheralded” economically and politically important exertions of 
regulatory power under “long extant statutes.”385 This constitutes 
an important canon from the standpoint of dynamic statutory 
interpretation. It suggests a judicial presumption in favor of 
adapting a statute to important new problems by not allowing it to 
reach the problem even if its text seems to apply.386 It comports 
with the recent anti-regulatory turn in the Republican Party.387 
But as Massachusetts v. EPA demonstrates, the Court has not 
consistently applied this anti-regulation presumption.388 In 
Michigan v. EPA, the Court created a presumption in favor of 
considering cost, thus putting itself in the camp of elite opinion at 
                                                                                                     
383.  Compare, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707, with Pennsylvania v. Del. 
Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 562–68 (1986). 
 384. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.  1933, 
1948–54 (2017) (discussing the newness of the “UARG canon”); cf. Manning, supra 
note 20, at 113 (suggesting that only “firmly established” background principles 
legitimately allow textualists to fill in textual gaps). 
 385. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323–24 (2014). This 
canon has an antecedent. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (applying the canon to reject FDA regulation of cigarettes 
as nicotine delivery devices in light of evidence that Congress has rejected 
cigarette regulation other than labeling); cf. Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About 
UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 16 (2015) (noting that after Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the major question canon appeared to be dead or in 
repose). 
 386. See Heinzerling, supra note 384, at 1946 (defining the canon as 
promising skepticism toward agency interpretations of “long extant statutes” as 
authorizing regulation in an area of “vast economic and political significance”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 387. See Buzbee, supra note 311, at 75 (characterizing this canon as 
“anti-regulatory”). 
 388. See Heinzerling, supra note 384, at 1953–54 (discussing the 
inconsistency between UARG, 573 U.S. 302 (2014), and Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 487 (2007)). 
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the expense of the philosophy behind the CAA.389 This canon 
constitutes a general principle favoring adaptation of the CAA to 
the elite opinion emanating from the law and economics 
movement.390  
In spite of the Court’s unity on the need to conform the statute 
to the prevailing principles of the law and economics movement, 
the Court remains divided on how to resolve cases. The only time 
in the last decade where the Court managed a unanimous CAA 
ruling—AEP—involves following precedent slighting text in favor 
of quasi-constitutional judicial lawmaking.391 Thus, the cases 
suggest a willingness to adhere to judicial policy, but no consensus 
on whether to follow the overall policy behind the CAA. 
V. Lessons for Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 
In this Part, we normatively critique the Court’s dynamic 
interpretation with a goal of advancing the art of dynamic 
statutory interpretation. We focus on how and when judges should 
adapt statutes to new problems with consideration of the propriety 
of judges updating statutes to reflect changes in elite or political 
opinion. 
A. Purpose as Dynamic Archaeology 
William Eskridge, the leading proponent of dynamic statutory 
interpretation, does not claim to have answered the key normative 
question that the existence of dynamic statutory interpretation 
                                                                                                     
 389. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (finding that cost 
should be a factor in deciding whether to regulate power plans and failing to 
discuss health and safety considerations’ role in the regulatory process). 
 390. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 297, 301 (discussing the idea 
of statutory canons as an expression of judicial ideology and some canons as 
responding to the scarcity concerns at the heart of law and economics). 
 391. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 (2011) 
(following Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), in holding that the CAA supplants 
the need for federal common law claims related to regulating emissions). 
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raises: how and when should judges dynamically construe 
statutes?392 
Eskridge presents dynamic interpretation as an alternative to 
both intentionalism and purposivism, which he characterizes as 
archaeological approaches.393  He concludes that purposivism, like 
intentionalism, “can establish no connection with majority-based 
preferences in the hard cases.”394 At the same time, he describes 
implementing the legislature’s “‘general intent’ about the goals of 
a statute” as a form of dynamic interpretation.395 And he favors 
“bending” the statute’s literal terms in order to achieve this 
general intent in adapting the statute to changing 
circumstances.396 Eskridge’s position suggests the possibility that 
judges can adapt a statute to new circumstances by using the 
values embedded in the statute’s goals to guide the adaptation and 
that doing so conforms to both the precepts of a “faithful agent” 
theory of statutory interpretation and the exigencies of dynamic 
interpretation.397 This means that archaeological and dynamic 
statutory approaches overlap when a court uses a very general 
congressional intent to decide how to adapt a statute to a new 
problem.398 We might call this “dynamic purposivism.” 
                                                                                                     
 392. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10,  at 107–08 (identifying the normative issues 
raised by an understanding of dynamic statutory interpretation as whether it is 
justifiable and if so when and how it should be used). 
 393. See id. at 13, 25–34 (characterizing discovery of congressional intent 
through text and purpose as “archaeological” and explaining why purposivism 
fails as a “foundational theory of statutory interpretation”). 
 394. Id. at 26. 
 395. See id. at 121 (pointing out that serving a statute’s goals requires 
dynamic interpretation as circumstances change in order to conform to “general 
intent”); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
223, 249–52 (1986) (advocating adherence to statutory purpose as an antidote to 
rent-seeking). 
 396. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 121. 
 397. See supra note 396 and accompanying text; Manning, supra note 20, at 
9 (explaining that purposivism allows “federal judges to fulfill their presumed 
duty as Congress’s faithful agents”). 
 398. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 26 (characterizing purposivism as 
“attractive” because it both “allows a statute to evolve” and ties “interpretation to 
original legislative expectations”). 
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One of us has argued previously that courts should construe 
statutes to effectuate their stated purposes, at least where the 
statute is ambiguous, primarily on the grounds that stated 
purposes are likely to reflect goals enjoying broad public 
support.399 This argument suggests that dynamic statutory 
interpretation should follow the general intent of the enacting 
Congress when possible.  
Eskridge’s suggestion that judges might appropriately bend 
text to dynamically interpret statutes in keeping with their 
purposes would support Justice Stevens’ dissent in Adamo.400 The 
term “emission standard[]” might most naturally indicate a 
numerical limit on the amount of air pollution, but perhaps the 
Court should have creatively read the term to include a work 
practice requirement that has the effect of limiting air pollution in 
order to allow the CAA to meet its goals.401 It is linguistically 
plausible to read the term “emission standard” as including any 
requirement that has the effect of reducing emissions, and such a 
reading would avoid the problem of hindering the enforcement of 
a properly enacted work practice standard.402 
Eskridge’s claim that neither purposivism nor intentionalism 
connects results to majority preferences in hard cases suggests an 
acknowledgment that they can do so in easy cases.403 From the 
standpoint of purposivism and intentionalism, Massachusetts v. 
EPA should have been an easy case.  
                                                                                                     
 399. See Driesen, supra note 86, at 98; see also Macey, supra note 395, at 250 
(claiming that a statute’s stated purpose will almost always be 
“public-regarding”). 
 400. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 293–307 (1978) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 50–55 (discussing 
dynamic interpretation of a prohibition on immigration of people with a “mental 
defect” to permit immigration of homosexuals in spite of original expectation that 
the term would exclude them from the U.S.).  
 401. See Adamo, 434 U.S. at 294–95 (Steven, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
term “emission standard” should be interpreted to allow the requirement to water 
down asbestos prior to demolition because this requirement has the “effect” of 
“curtail[ing] the quantity of asbestos . . . emitted”). 
 402. See id. at 306 (pointing out that the majority’s reading makes work 
practice standards unenforceable). 
 403. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.  
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This case may have divided the Court not because it is hard to 
discern what the enacting Congresses intended based on 
purposivism and intentionalism (as required by the archaeological 
approach), but because applying the statute faithfully to this 
particular new problem puts judges in the uncomfortable position 
of deciding an important question that is politically controversial 
now. This adaptive aspect of Massachusetts v. EPA, not textual 
ambiguity or any legitimate doubt about the CAA’s purpose, may 
explain why it generated a 5–4 decision.404 Justice Stevens wrote 
about the congruity of adaptation to a new problem with following 
Congressional intent in his opinion for the Court: 
While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have 
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead 
to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory 
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments 
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad 
language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer 
the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.405 
Justice Stevens did not explain why failing to apply the CAA to 
greenhouse gases renders the statute obsolete, but the answer is 
plain enough. The CAA is intended to protect public health and the 
environment, and it cannot do so absent coverage of greenhouse 
gases. Thus, this passage can be read as supporting construing 
general capacious language naturally to allow adaptations serving 
the statute’s purposes.  
Although the dissent’s statutory argument on the merits is 
cast in terms of deference to EPA, the dissent on standing (for the 
same four Justices) suggests a desire to follow the policy judgment 
of current elected officials.406 Justice Scalia has elsewhere 
expressed concern that adaptive interpretation might prevent 
statutes from dying a natural death and therefore interfere with 
the prerogatives of new Congresses.407 This conservative desire to 
                                                                                                     
 404. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–30 (2007). 
 405. Id. at 532.  
 406. See id. at 535 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting ongoing consideration of 
climate disruption in Congress and the Executive Branch and describing the 
litigation as an expression of dissatisfaction with the elected branches’ progress 
on the issue). 
 407. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324–25 (1988). 
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avoid expansive interpretation of regulatory statutes might help 
explain why textually strained arguments appeared sensible to 
dissenters who often find much more constraint in more 
ambiguous texts.408  
All of this suggests that dynamic statutory interpretation 
based on the judges’ views becomes inevitable when the statute 
and its purpose bear an uncertain relationship to the problem at 
hand, but that in cases where the text or purpose bear pretty 
plainly on a new issue before the Court, dynamic purposivism 
remains an available option. Indeed, the faithful agent theory (that 
the Courts should be a “faithful agent” of the enacting Congress) 
would suggest that the dissenters erred because they should have 
simply applied the text and purpose to the new pollutant.409 In 
other words, recognizing that dynamic interpretation based on the 
judges’ views becomes inevitable in hard cases does not rule out 
the possibility that dynamic purposivism can establish a 
connection to majority preferences in easy cases.  
 Legislation usually attempts to govern the future by 
establishing broad general principles that apply to future 
circumstances, not through exclusive examples.410 Thus, the CAA 
is about air pollutants, substances that harm public health and the 
environment when emitted into the air, not just about the 
particular pollutants causing the problems that Congress knew 
about in 1970.411 The rule of law suggests that the Court should 
                                                                                                     
 408. Compare Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 556–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(advancing a textually strained interpretation of “air pollutant”), with Michigan 
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015) (majority opinion) (Scalia, J.) (reading 
the phrase “appropriate and necessary” as requiring consideration of cost and 
declining to defer to EPA’s contrary interpretation under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), and EPA v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 542 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting 
the requirement that EPA promulgate a federal implementation plan “at any time 
within 2 years” after disapproving a SIP as not permitting exercise of that 
authority prior to giving states additional guidance not explicitly required by the 
CAA). 
 409. See Manning, supra note 20, at 9. 
 410. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 475 (1989) 
(“[Congress] usually does not legislate by specifying examples, but by identifying 
broad and general principles that must be applied to particular factual 
instances”). 
 411. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 506 (quoting the relevant statutory 
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follow the statute’s text and purpose when they provide an answer 
to the question before them, as it did in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
B. How and When to Adapt Statutes to Changes in Elite and 
Political Opinion 
It may appear troubling to Justices to let legislation apply to 
new problems within the ambit of applicable statutory language or 
purpose, when the current legislature would not endorse the 
result. That problem, we have suggested, caused a 5–4 split in 
Massachusetts v. EPA. 
Scalia’s concern about preserving the prerogatives of the 
current Congress cannot supply an adequate answer to the 
question of how to address a split between current political opinion 
and the opinion of the drafters of an old statute. No matter what 
the Court does, congressional prerogatives remain intact. Congress 
remained free, after Massachusetts v. EPA, to pass legislation 
forbidding federal regulation of greenhouse gases.412 And had the 
Court held that the CAA currently does not authorize regulation of 
greenhouse gases, Congress would remain free to override that 
decision and authorize standards limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions. The concept of “congressional prerogative” must refer to 
the right to pass legislation, which is a right of the institution as a 
whole, not a right belonging to an individual member or a faction 
within the Congress. 
When the Court issues holdings contrary to statutory purpose 
and when the enacting coalition remains in power in Congress and 
the White House, judicial decisions may not matter very much. As 
Hancock and Adamo illustrate, the congressional coalitions that 
enacted the original statute can override judicial decisions 
contrary to the enacting coalition’s intentions to correct the Court’s 
misreading.413 Hence, the Court’s deviations from congressional 
                                                                                                     
provisions, which require regulation of air pollutants defined as substances 
emitted into the air that endanger public health and the environment rather than 
list particular substances). 
 412. See id. at 533–35. 
 413. See United States v. Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d 1273, 1287 n.22 
(3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the 1977 Amendments superseded Hancock v. 
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intent in Hancock and Adamo had a very limited impact, because 
Congresses that consistently favored environmental protection 
promptly superseded these decisions.414  
But when the enacting coalition does not remain in power, 
judicial decisions, even incorrect ones, may matter a lot. The 
Court’s CAA decisions have become more important lately, 
precisely because political opinion has become divided and the 
prospects for legislative correction of judicial decisions 
correspondingly diminished. In this context, the policy impacts of 
the Court’s decisions about how to adapt an old statute to changing 
opinions and circumstances are sharpened. 
The analysis above suggests that the rule of law requires that 
judges follow the general intention of the enacting Congress even 
when adapting the statute to a new problem that Congress did not 
specifically consider. The Massachusetts v. EPA dissent did not 
follow the law, nor would its opinion preserve some threatened 
prerogative of Congress as a whole. Instead, the dissenting 
Justices voted, in effect, to conform the statute to the views of much 
of the Republican Party.415 Judges should not conform a statute to 
current political opinion when it matters—when political opinion 
is too divided to allow an override—because in that circumstance 
they can only conform the statute to one party’s opinion not to a 
widely shared political preference. Instead, judges should follow 
statutory purpose and text revealing an intention about the matter 
before them, even when the consensus undergirding the original 
statute has shattered.  
But in cases where such a general intention does not provide 
clear guidance about how to resolve an issue before the Court, the 
Court must make a policy decision about how the statute should 
apply to the new problem. In other words, sometimes dynamic 
statutory interpretation that reflects changes in views is inevitable 
because, as Eskridge argues, archaeological approaches sometimes 
                                                                                                     
Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976)); United States v. Ethyl Corp., 576 F. Supp. 80, 82 
(M.D. La. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 761 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986). 
 414. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.  
 415. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 560 (2007) (concluding that 
EPA should be granted discretion in deciding not to regulate greenhouse gases 
and noting that the “alarm over global warming may or may not be justified”). 
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provide no convincing connection to the intentions of the enacting 
Congress.416  
As a practical matter, judges will tend to resolve such open 
questions based on their own views. Such a practice raises 
constitutional concerns, which we analyze, but do not completely 
resolve.417  
The Court has frequently rejected judicial policymaking and 
suggested it is constitutionally suspect.418 Doctrinally, this view 
emerges perhaps most clearly in cases disfavoring the creation of 
federal common law.419 But if the Constitution disfavors judicial 
policymaking and congressional intent does not resolve a case, 
what should a judge do? 
In practice, judges tend to enact the views of the elites of which 
they are a part into law.420 The CAA case study provides examples 
of this tendency in what we might call the “law and economics 
cases”—the cases construing “appropriate and necessary” and the 
Good Neighbor Provision to embrace consideration of cost.421 These 
cases echo the Lochner-era cases, discussed by Eskridge, in which 
the Supreme Court conformed the antitrust statutes to elite views 
by using them to authorize injunctions against labor actions.422 In 
all of these cases, the dynamic statutory constructions conformed 
statutes to fairly well developed views amongst intellectual and 
policymaking elites.  
                                                                                                     
 416. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 14. 
 417. Cf. id. at 108 (admitting that he cannot fully answer the question of how 
judges should conduct dynamic statutory interpretation). 
 418. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1977) (stating that 
judges must “put aside” their views of the wisdom of a congressionally chosen 
course of action in interpreting a statute). 
 419. See, e.g., Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 312–13 (1981) (stating that federal 
courts, “purposefully insulated from democratic pressures,” normally lack 
authority to develop rules of decision).  
 420. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 82 (discussing how judges created the 
federal labor injunction in conjunction with other legal elites). 
 421. See supra notes 352, 367 and accompanying text. 
 422. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 82 (identifying the roots of the labor 
injunction in the “economic ideology held by legal elites”); cf. David M. Driesen, 
Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, 36 ENVTL. L. 603, 614–21, 626–29 
(2006) (discussing parallels between Lochner-era statutory interpretation and 
judicial support for CBA under environmental statutes). 
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This approach to dynamic statutory interpretation raises 
constitutional concerns, because it seems to conflict with popular 
sovereignty. In the case of the CAA, opinion polls indicate that the 
public does not generally buy into the balancing approach that has 
captured the imagination of the elites. The labor injunction cases 
harmed the reputation of the Lochner-era Court, because 
ideological decision-making appears illegitimate, and Congress 
repudiated many of these cases on several occasions, finally 
leading the Court to renounce its elitist approach to antitrust 
law.423 
The idea that popular opinion should govern the resolution of 
issues requiring dynamic statutory interpretation draws support 
from the Constitution’s preamble, which states that “we, the 
people . . . establish” the Constitution and by its provisions 
establishing policymaking authority in an elected Congress and, to 
some extent, in an elected President.424 The idea that the entire 
government derives its authority from the people suggests that the 
Court should follow popular rather than elite views.  
On the other hand, the Constitution tempers popular 
democracy, reflecting some anxiety about the possibility of 
democratic excess. These anxieties led to creation of the Senate, 
the electoral college, the separation of powers, and an unelected 
judiciary with lifetime tenure.425 For these reasons, it is hard to 
                                                                                                     
 423. See Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Dairy Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 
91, 101–03 (1940) (discussing legislative findings that the Court had largely 
nullified Clayton Act restrictions on the labor injunction and holding that 
Congress had drastically curtailed this practice in the Norris LaGuardia Act); cf. 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 95–104 (providing a more nuanced account of the 
labor injunction cases and congressional efforts to temper them).  
 424. See U.S. CONST. pmbl., arts. I–II; see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE (1991); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 
(2001). 
 425. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (requiring legislators to choose Senators); id. art. 
II, § 1 (providing that an electoral college select the President); id. art. II, § 2 
(providing for Presidential appointment of Supreme Court Justices); id. art. III, 
§ 1 (providing lifetime tenure for Supreme Court Justices); id. amend. XVII 
(providing for popular election of U.S. Senators, but leaving the number at two 
per state regardless of population). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION 
OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980) (trying to reconcile the 
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argue that the Constitution wholly precludes independent elitist 
policymaking by the judiciary, however troubling that might be.426 
We have some doubts about whether the Court could 
accurately follow current popular views in resolving questions that 
past congressional intent cannot resolve even if it chose to do so. 
Opinion polls can be unreliable and may not track the issues before 
the Court with sufficient precision. Yet, some awareness by judges 
that their most natural inclinations may prove at odds with 
popular views should temper their approach to dynamic statutory 
interpretation.  
The tendency of judges to follow elite views appears most 
troubling when it influences the outcomes in cases that do not pose 
new problems and therefore do not seem to require dynamic 
statutory interpretation. The law and economics cases appear 
troubling in part because the problems they dealt with, while 
perhaps not resolved clearly by statutory text, were anticipated by 
Congress.427 One would expect the CAA’s philosophy, which 
reflects popular opinion, rather than the judiciary’s elitist 
approach to control such cases. Dynamic statutory interpretation 
based on elite views seems more appropriate when confronting a 
new problem not anticipated by Congress, such as the problem of 
the scope of greenhouse gas regulation that the UARG Court 
confronted. 
Chevron, whatever its weaknesses, does provide a resource for 
ameliorating some of the dilemmas arising in cases demanding or 
tending to trigger dynamic statutory interpretation.428 The Court 
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could defer to EPA, instead of acting on its own when the statute 
is ambiguous.429 But the CAA cases involving Chevron deference 
suggest that Chevron has not constrained ideological 
decision-making, because the Justices apply it so selectively.430 
They refuse to defer to the Obama EPA’s interpretation of the 
completely open-ended clause “appropriate and necessary” but 
many of them find a provision defining a pollutant as including any 
substance emitted into the ambient air sufficiently ambiguous to 
justify deference to the Bush EPA.431 
One of us has suggested that the Roberts Court reflects, to 
some degree, the polarization of our times in its constitutional 
decision-making.432 This case study suggests that the same thing 
has happened in the context of an extraordinarily detailed and 
prescriptive statute, the CAA. Increasingly, these divisions occur 
in archaeologically easy cases (like Massachusetts v. EPA), not just 
in hard ones. And this division often occurs as the Justices engage 
in dynamic statutory interpretation in cases that might be resolved 
fairly easily by intentionalism. While Eskridge is surely right that 
dynamic statutory interpretation based on judicial views of 
sensible adaptation is inevitable in hard cases, it is troubling to see 
it have such a strong influence in easy ones. 
VI. Conclusion 
While statutory text and purpose played a major role in the 
CAA’s early years, increasingly the Court issues rulings divided 
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along ideological lines, even in apparently easy cases. While some 
dynamic statutory interpretation is inevitable, this Court 
sometimes updates statutes to reflect political or elitist views not 
embraced by a clear popular majority even in cases that do not 
seem to require abandonment of an archaeological approach. Some 
of this ideological updating occurs in the context of a new problem, 
but some of it does not.  
We suggest that judges should pay more attention to statutory 
purpose in order to counter modern judges’ tendencies to update 
the law to conform to their own preferences. At the same time, we 
recognize that dynamic statutory interpretation is inevitable in 
some cases and that the Constitution does not wholly preclude 
updating to reflect new opinions. The modern Court’s CAA 
jurisprudence, however, suggests an erosion of the rule of law and 
an expansion of politics’ domain within the judiciary over time. We 
find this expansion troubling, as one might imagine that a 
prescriptive statute might constrain judicial decision-making more 
effectively than an open-textured constitutional text. 
